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ADOPTING REGULATORY OBJECTIVES 
FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
Laurel S. Terry,* Steve Mark,** & Tahlia Gordon***
 
 
In 2007, the United Kingdom adopted a new law called the Legal 
Services Act.  This Act radically changed certain aspects of U.K. lawyer 
regulation.  Section 1 of that Act identified eight “regulatory objectives” 
that provide the basis for the regulation of the legal profession.  The United 
Kingdom is not the only jurisdiction that has identified regulatory 
objectives.  A number of Canadian provinces, for example, have provisions 
that are tantamount to regulatory objectives.  Australia is also in the 
process of developing such objectives and routinely uses “purpose 
statements” when enacting legal profession regulation.  However, many 
countries—including the United States—have not explicitly identified 
regulatory objectives and do not use purpose statements. 
This Article analyzes various regulatory objectives that have been 
adopted or proposed.  It places the use of regulatory objectives and purpose 
statements in lawyer regulation in a broader context by describing some of 
the recent profession-specific and non-profession-specific regulatory 
reform initiatives.  The Article recommends that jurisdictions that have not 
yet adopted regulatory objectives for the legal profession do so.  Finally, 
the Article concludes by offering recommended regulatory objective 
concepts for jurisdictions to consider. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In another article in this colloquium, we identify six trends in lawyer 
regulation that are due in part to the impact of globalization on the legal 
profession.1
In recent years, there has been increased interest in the question of why 
lawyers should be regulated.  Some of this interest can be attributed to 
recent regulatory reform movements and to the United Kingdom’s inclusion 
of “regulatory objectives” in its 2007 legislation regulating the legal 
profession. 
  These trends include issues about who regulates lawyers, 
whom or what is regulated, when lawyers are regulated, where lawyers may 
be regulated, how they are regulated, and why they are regulated.  This 
Article expands on why lawyers are regulated. 
We submit that regulatory objectives are a necessity, and jurisdictions 
that have not adopted regulatory objectives should seriously consider doing 
so.  The adoption of regulatory objectives has multifaceted benefits.  First, 
the inclusion of regulatory objectives definitively sets out the purpose of 
lawyer regulation and its parameters.  Regulatory objectives thus serve as a 
guide to assist those regulating the legal profession and those being 
regulated.  Second, regulatory objectives identify, for those affected by the 
particular regulation, the purpose of that regulation and why it is enforced.  
Third, regulatory objectives assist in ensuring that the function and purpose 
of the particular legislation is transparent.  Thus, when the regulatory body 
administering the legislation is questioned—for example, about its 
interpretation of the legislation—the regulatory body can point to the 
regulatory objectives to demonstrate compliance with function and purpose.  
Fourth, regulatory objectives can help define the parameters of the 
legislation and of public debate about proposed legislation.  Finally, 
regulatory objectives may help the legal profession when it is called upon to 
negotiate with governmental and nongovernmental entities about 
regulations affecting legal practice. 
Part I of this Article places the legal profession’s regulatory objectives–
purpose movement in a larger context by:  (1) identifying increased interest 
in regulatory theory generally; (2) identifying increased interest in lawyer 
regulation specifically; and (3) noting that other professions, such as 
medicine and financial services, are governed by regulatory objectives.  Part 
II examines those jurisdictions that have adopted regulatory objectives for 
the legal profession, those jurisdictions that have drafted but not yet 
adopted regulatory objectives, and those jurisdictions that have not yet 
focused on the use of regulatory objectives.  Part III of this Article explains 
the basis for our general recommendation that all jurisdictions adopt 
regulatory objectives.  Finally, Part IV identifies the specific regulatory 
objectives that we recommend a jurisdiction should adopt. 
 
 1. See Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark, & Tahlia Gordon, Trends and Challenges in 
Lawyer Regulation:  The Impact of Globalization and Technology, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2661 (2012). 
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I.  PLACING THE LEGAL PROFESSION REGULATORY OBJECTIVES–PURPOSE 
MOVEMENT IN A LARGER CONTEXT 
The adoption or pending adoption of regulatory objectives in legal 
profession regulation can be understood as part of a larger context in which 
there has been increased interest in regulatory theory in general, and legal 
profession regulation specifically.  This section provides a brief 
introduction to some of these developments. 
A.  The “Regulatory Objectives” Trend Reflects Increased Interest 
in Regulatory Theory Generally 
The trend toward adopting regulatory objectives for the legal profession 
has taken place against the backdrop of global governmental interest in 
regulatory theory.  A number of individual countries have explored what it 
means to have “good regulation.”2  Intergovernmental organizations such as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have also explored 
these issues.3  The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been struggling 
with the issue of what constitutes appropriate domestic regulation (and thus 
should not be viewed as a barrier to trade).4
A typical example is the OECD’s extensive regulatory reform initiative.
 
5
(i) serve clearly identified policy goals, and be effective in achieving 
those goals; 
  
The 2005 OECD report, Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and 
Performance, states that good regulation should: 
(ii) have a sound legal and empirical basis; 
(iii) produce benefits that justify costs, considering the distribution of 
effects across society and taking economic, environmental and social 
effects into account; 
(iv) minimise costs and market distortions; 
 
 2. See, e.g., Better Regulation, U.K. DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS (BIS), 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/betterregulation (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); Self-Regulated 
Professions:  Balancing Competition and Regulation, COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA 37–41, 
(2007) [hereinafter CANADIAN COMPETITION REPORT], available at http://www.competition
bureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Professions%20
study%20final%20E.pdf/$FILE/Professions%20study%20final%20E.pdf. 
 3. See Regulatory Reform, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_37421_
1_1_1_1_37421,00.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); The APEC-OECD Co-operative 
Initiative on Regulatory Reform, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3343,
en_2649_34141_2397017_1_1_1_37421,00.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  The United 
States, Canada, and Australia are members of APEC and the OECD. See id. 
 4. See, e.g., General Agreement on Trade in Services art. 6.4, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 
189–90.  For a discussion of the “domestic regulation disciplines” debates, see Laurel S. 
Terry, From GATS to APEC:  The Impact of Trade Agreements on Legal Services, 
43 AKRON L. REV. 875, 895–98 (2010). 
 5. See Regulatory Reform, supra note 3. 
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(v) promote innovation through market incentives and goal-based 
approaches; 
(vi) be clear, simple, and practical for users; 
(vii) be consistent with other regulations and policies; and 
(viii) be compatible as far as possible with competition, trade and 
investment-facilitating principles at domestic and international levels.6
APEC has a joint regulatory project with the OECD.
 
7  APEC is an 
intergovernmental organization that consists of the twenty-one countries 
that, roughly speaking, surround the Pacific Ocean.8  For example, the 
APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform asks whether 
regulation (broadly defined) is transparent, consistent, comprehensible, 
accessible to domestic and international users, governmental and 
nongovernmental users, and whether its effectiveness is regularly assessed.9
In addition to the APEC and OECD intergovernmental recommendations, 
a number of individual countries have also considered these types of issues.  
Among these countries, a common approach is to first determine whether 
regulation is necessary, for example, because of information asymmetry or 
externalities.  If regulation, such as lawyer regulation, is considered 
necessary, the next question is whether specific regulations are consistent 
with the principles of good regulation.  Different entities have articulated 
these general regulatory principles in different ways.  The United Kingdom, 
for example, has an entity known as the Better Regulation Executive (BRE) 
that has conducted extensive work.
 
10  In the past, the BRE articulated five 
ideal qualities for regulation:  (1) transparency; (2) accountability; (3) 
proportionality; (4) consistency; and (5) targeting—that is, regulation aimed 
only at cases where action is needed.11
 
 6. OECD Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance, OECD 3 
(2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/51/37318586.pdf. 
  U.K. legal profession regulators 
 7. See, e.g., Economic Committee, APEC, http://www.apec.org/Home/Groups/
Economic-Committee (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (“In 2004, APEC Leaders endorsed an 
ambitious work programme called the Leaders’ Agenda to Implement Structural Reform 
2010 (LAISR).  The agenda covers five areas for structural policy reform:  regulatory 
reform, competition policy, public sector governance, corporate governance, and 
strengthening economic and legal infrastructure.” (emphasis added)). 
 8. See About Us:  Member Economies, APEC, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-
APEC/Member-Economies.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  For additional information 
about APEC’s role with respect to legal services, see Terry, supra note 4; APEC Legal 
Services Initiative, APEC, http://www.legalservices.apec.org/index.html (last visited Apr. 
21, 2012). 
 9. See APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform, OECD 7 (2008), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/9/34989455.pdf [hereinafter APEC-OECD Checklist]. 
 10. See Better Regulation, supra note 2. 
 11. Compare id., with BRE:  What We Do, http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/ (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012); see also BETTER REGULATION TASK FORCE, BETTER REGULATION—
FROM DESIGN TO DELIVERY 26–27 (2005); infra note 274.  Although the BRE no longer 
features these five principles on its website, a number of U.K. entities continue to cite these 
five principles of good regulation. See, e.g., Better Regulation, U.K. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, 
http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/business/regulation/31993.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 
2012) (stating that “[w]e follow five principles of better regulation”); How HSE Meets the 
Obligations in the Statutory Regulators’ Compliance Code, U.K. HEALTH & SAFETY EXEC., 
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have been among those who have explored questions about the nature of 
“good” regulation.12
The Canadian antitrust division relied on the OECD principles in the 
“Effective Regulation” chapter of its 2007 review of “self-regulated” 
professions, including the legal profession.  Although the Canadian 
government reframed the OECD principles, the thrust of its report was 
similar: 
 
1. Restrictions should be directly linked to clear and verifiable outcomes; 
2. Regulation should be the minimum necessary to achieve stated 
objectives; 
3. The regulatory process must be impartial and not self-serving; 
4. A regulatory scheme should allow for periodic assessment of its 
effectiveness and be subject to regular reviews; and 
5. A primary objective of the regulatory framework should be to promote 
open and effectively competitive markets.13
The Canadian antitrust authorities recommended that regulators conduct 
a “competition assessment” that asks:  (1) “Does the proposal limit the 
number or range of suppliers?”; (2) “Does the proposal limit the ability of 
suppliers to compete?”; and (3) “Does the proposal reduce the incentive of 
suppliers to compete vigorously?”
 
14
Australia is among the jurisdictions that have considered the issue of 
what makes for good regulation.  The Australian Office of Best Practice 
Regulation (OBPR) promotes the government’s objective of improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of regulation.
 
15  The OBPR plays a central role 
in assisting Australian government departments and agencies in meeting the 
Australian government’s requirements for best practice regulatory impact 
analysis and in monitoring and reporting on their performance.16  The 
OBPR also serves a similar role for the Council of Australian Governments’ 
(COAG) requirements, in relation to national regulatory proposals 
considered by ministerial councils, national standard-setting bodies, or 
COAG itself.17
 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/regulation/compliancecode/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) 
(“Since the early 1990s, we have followed the five principles of good regulation:  
proportionality, accountability, consistency, transparency and targeting.”). 
 
 12. See, e.g., Christopher Decker & George Yarrow, Understanding the Economic 
Rationale for Legal Services Regulation, REG. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 31, 2010), 
http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/latest_news/pdf/economic_rational
e_for_Legal_Services_Regulation_Final.pdf. 
 13. See CANADIAN COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 2, at 37–41. 
 14. See id. at 40. 
 15. See Office of Best Practice Regulation, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF FIN. & 
DEREGULATION:  OFF. BEST PRACTICE REG., http://www.finance.gov.au/obpr/about/ (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Best Practices Regulation:  A Guide for Ministerial Councils and National 
Standard Setting Bodies, COUNCIL AUSTRALIAN GOV’TS 7–9 (2007), http://www.finance.gov.
au/obpr/docs/COAG_best_practice_guide_2007.pdf. 
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The Australian government has endorsed the following six principles of 
good regulatory process identified by the Taskforce on Reducing 
Regulatory Burdens on Business: 
Governments should not act to address “problems” until a case for action 
has been clearly established.  This should include establishing the nature 
of the problem and why actions additional to existing measures are 
needed, recognizing that not all “problems” will justify (additional) 
government action. 
A range of feasible policy options—including self-regulatory and co-
regulatory approaches—need to be identified and their benefits and costs, 
including compliance costs, assessed within an appropriate framework. 
Only the option that generates the greatest net benefit for the community, 
taking into account all the impacts, should be adopted. 
Effective guidance should be provided to relevant regulators and 
regulated parties in order to ensure that the policy intent of the regulation 
is clear, as well as the expected compliance requirements. 
Mechanisms are needed to ensure that regulation remains relevant and 
effective over time. 
There needs to be effective consultation with regulated parties at all stages 
of the regulatory cycle.18
 The United States has also engaged in regulatory reform initiatives.
 
19  Its 
efforts have been multifaceted and include regulatory impact analyses or 
assessments,20 efforts to reduce the impact of regulations on small 
businesses,21 and to reduce paperwork.22  Although the United States does 
not have a central entity responsible for regulatory reform, its overall efforts 
have been positively reviewed.23
 
 18. See Rethinking Regulation:  Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on 
Business, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T 147 (Jan. 2006), http://www.regulationtaskforce.gov.au/
__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/69721/regulationtaskforce.pdf. 
 
 19. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Announces 
Regulatory Reform Initiative Results with Japan (July 6, 2009), http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/2009/july/ustr-announces-regulatory-reform-initiative-results-
j; see also NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS:  CREATING A 
GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS (1993), available at http://www.nsf.gov/
pubs/stis1993/npr93a/npr93a.txt 
 20. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Sept. 30, 1993), available at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_12866.pdf; OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. 
 21. See, e.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. § 605(b) (2006); Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 601 note. 
 22. See, e.g., Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., OECD, REGULATORY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES:  GOVERNMENT 
CAPACITY TO ASSURE HIGH-QUALITY REGULATION 45 (1999), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/19/2478900.pdf (“The US government faces formidable 
legislative, institutional, judicial and structural constraints on good regulatory practices. Yet, 
by most measures, the capacities of the US federal government for assuring the quality of 
federal regulation are among the best in OECD countries.”). 
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As these examples show, in recent years, governments have been 
interested in thinking about what makes a good regulatory system.  
Commentators have also been interested in these issues.24  Thus, when 
considering the issue of regulatory objectives, it is useful to be aware of the 
broader context in which these developments have occurred.  To the extent 
regulatory objectives are consistent with a jurisdiction’s regulatory 
approach, they are more likely to be embraced by that jurisdiction.  These 
general principles may, however, require adaptation when applied to legal 
professional regulators.  For example, as explained in greater detail in Part 
IV, one of the questions that we have about some of these regulatory reform 
initiatives is the proper role of “empiricism” in legal profession regulation 
because it may be difficult to measure ex ante the impact of regulatory 
changes on objectives such as public interest or the rule of law.25
B.  The “Regulatory Objectives” Trend Reflects Increased Interest 
in Lawyer Regulation Specifically 
   
In addition to the increased interest in regulatory reform theory in 
general, the regulatory objectives movement has taken place in the context 
of greater interest in the theory of lawyer regulation.  (It is also worth 
noting that other professions are subject to regulatory objectives.26
During the last two decades, there were a number of analyses of 
professions, including the legal profession, which were prepared by various 
competition or antitrust authorities.  In the United Kingdom, for example, 
the 2007 U.K. Legal Services Act (U.K. Act) arose out of the Clementi 
Report.
)  It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to explore in detail the background or 
results of these sometimes lengthy legal profession regulation studies, but it 
is instructive to realize how many there have been. 
27  The Clementi Report was inspired, at least in part, by a U.K. 
Office of Fair Trading report that focused on the legal profession,28
 
 24. See, e.g., Decker & Yarrow, supra note 
 which 
12; Adam Muchmore, Private Regulation 
and Foreign Conduct, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 371 (2010). 
 25. See, e.g., CANADIAN COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 2, at 37 (“Restrictions should 
be directly linked to clear and verifiable outcomes.”); APEC-OECD Checklist, supra note 9, 
at 15 (“Are the legal basis and the economic and social impacts of drafts of new regulations 
reviewed?  What performance measurements are being envisaged for reviewing the 
economic and social impacts of new regulations?”); OECD Guiding Principles for 
Regulatory Quality & Performance, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that “[g]ood regulation 
should:  (i) serve clearly identified policy goals, and be effective in achieving those goals; 
(ii) have a sound legal and empirical basis;” along with six other items); infra note 276 and 
accompanying text. 
 26. Early drafts of this Article included information about the regulatory objectives that 
apply to other professionals, such as those in the fields of health and accounting.  While we 
have since omitted this information from the Article, both cross-cultural and cross-
professional comparisons can be useful. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of 
the Legal Profession:  The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers,” 
2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189, 210. 
 27. See infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Director General of Fair Trading, Competition in the Professions, OFF. FAIR 
TRADING 328 (Mar. 2001), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/professional_bodies/
oft328.pdf. 
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in turn was probably influenced, at least in part, by the “competition” or 
antitrust reports prepared by the OECD.29  In 2003, the European Union 
launched a competition project that focused on five issues related to five 
professions, including the legal profession.30  This EU initiative spawned a 
number of inquiries in EU member states about the regulation of the legal 
profession.31  In addition to these OECD and governmental reports about 
lawyer regulation, there were a number of consultant reports that were 
commissioned by governments, bar associations, and others.32
 
 29. See Competition in Professional Services, OECD 2 (1999), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/4/1920231.pdf (“This document comprises proceedings in 
the original languages of a Roundtable on Competition in Professional Services, which was 
held by the Working Party No. 2 of the Committee on Competition Law and Policy in June 
1999.”).  Several years later, the OECD issued a report on competition in the legal services 
sector. See Competitive Restrictions in Legal Professions, OECD 18 n.5 (Apr. 27, 2009), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/38/40080343.pdf. 
 
 30. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION:  
REPORT ON COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 5 (Feb. 9, 2004), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0083en01.pdf; COMM’N OF THE 
EUROPEAN CMTYS, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION:  PROFESSIONAL SERVICES—
SCOPE FOR MORE REFORM:  FOLLOW-UP TO THE REPORT ON COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES 10 (2005) [hereinafter EU FOLLOW-UP REPORT], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0405:FIN:EN:PDF.  For 
additional information about this EU Competition Initiative, see Laurel S. Terry, The 
European Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional Services, 29 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 69 (2009).  The EU commissioned a report about competition among the 
liberal professions. Iain Paterson et al., Economic Impact of Regulation in the Field of 
Liberal Professions in Different Member States, EUROPEAN COMM’N, DG COMPETITION 9 n.1 
(Jan. 2003), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/professional_services/studies/prof_
services_ihs_part_1.pdf.  The EU announced the launch of its initiative at the same time that 
it announced the publication of the report it had commissioned. See Terry, supra, at 32. 
 31. See generally EU FOLLOW-UP REPORT, supra note 30; Terry, supra note 30, at 62–
66. 
 32. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 2004:  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
COMPETITION LAW AND (LIBERAL) PROFESSIONS (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela 
Atanasiu eds., 2006) (contains written contributions from the 2004 Workshop and edited 
transcripts of the debates); BARBARA BAARSMA ET AL., REGULATION OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION AND ACCESS TO LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 48 (2008), available at 
http://www.seo.nl/uploads/media/2008-01_Regulation_of_the_legal_profession_access_to
_law.pdf; COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS, THE LEGAL PROFESSION:  COMPETITION AND 
LIBERALISATION (2006), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/
NTCdocument/The_legal_profession1_1195120689.pdf; COUNCIL BS. & L. SOC’YS EUROPE, 
CCBE ECONOMIC SUBMISSION TO COMMISSION PROGRESS REPORT ON COMPETITION IN 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES (2006), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/
NTCdocument/ccbe_economic_submis1_1182239202.pdf; Economic Impact of Regulation 
in Liberal Professions:  A Critique of the IHS Report, RBB ECONOMICS (Sept. 9, 2003), 
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/rbb_ihs_critique_en1_118370620
6.pdf; Martin Henssler & Matthias Kilian, Economic Impact of Regulation in the Field of 
Liberal Professions in Different Member States, HANS-SOLDAN-STIFTUNG (Sept. 2003), 
available at http://www.anwaltverein.de/downloads/praxis/Positionspapier-Henssler-Kilian-
Englisch-Endversion.pdf; Christoph Schmid et al., Preliminary Findings from the Ongoing 
Study on “Conveyancing Services Regulation in Europe,” EUROPEAN COMM’N, DG 
COMPETITION 4 n.2 (Dec. 11, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/
professional_services/conferences/20061230/09_zerp.pdf; Nuno Garoupa, Regulation of 
Professions in the US and Europe:  A Comparative Analysis (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, 
Working Paper No. 42, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1053&context=alea. 
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This interest in legal profession regulation has not been limited to 
Europe.  As noted earlier, in 2008, the Canadian antitrust authority issued a 
report on self-regulated professions and recommended several changes.33  It 
issued its follow-up report in September 2011.34  The Australian 
competition initiative began in 1994 and included the legal profession 
within its reforms.35  Antitrust authorities elsewhere in the world also have 
been interested in issues related to regulation of the legal profession.36  
Although the past few years have not seen as intense an interest in the legal 
profession by antitrust authorities as in the past decade, there is still interest.  
The OECD, for example, has a project known as STRI—Services Trade 
Restrictiveness Index—that attempts to measure barriers to trade.37
There has also been a flurry of reports issued in the wake of the 
groundbreaking Australian developments related to public issuance of law 
firm shares, incorporated legal practices, and the proactive ex ante approach 
to lawyer regulation that has been based on the statutory requirement that 
incorporated legal practices have “appropriate management systems.”
  Legal 
services is one of the sectors whose barriers are measured. 
38  
These reports have focused on the theory of regulation,39 as well as the 
empirical results.40
 
  For additional information, see Daniel Vázquez Albert, Competition Law and 
Professional Practice, 11 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 555, 568 & nn.8–10 (2005); Thomas D. 
Morgan, The Impact of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 415 
(1998); Terry, supra note 
 
30; see also John E. Lopatka, Antitrust and Professional Rules:  A 
Framework for Analysis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 301, 375–79 (1991) (discussing the FTC’s 
California Dental Association decision and the application of antitrust principles to 
professionals other than lawyers). 
 33. See CANADIAN COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 2. 
 34. See COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA, SELF-REGULATED PROFESSIONS—POST-STUDY 
ASSESSMENT (2011), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/
03407.html. 
 35. See, e.g., LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, BLUEPRINT FOR THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION:  A NATIONAL MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES 3 (July 1994), available at 
http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=2F019E0B-
1E4F-17FA-D26D-E43663EDE0F9&siteName=lca; see also Steve A. Mark & Georgina 
Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices—A New Era in the Provision of Legal Services in 
the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 671 (2004) (explaining that NSW’s 
multidisciplinary practice rules were changed as a result of this report); National 
Competition Policy Review of the Legal Profession Act, LAWLINK, 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/report%5Clpd_reports.nsf/pages/ncp_1 (explaining why the 
1995 amendments to the Trade Practices Act of 1974 led to the 1998 competition review of 
the legal profession). 
 36. See, e.g., Int’l Inst. of Law Ass’n Chief Executives, The Implementation of the 
Reform of the Legal Profession—Case Studies in Change (Aug. 18, 2006), IILACE 2006 
New York City Conference Program August 17–19 (on file with author). 
 37. OECD, Indicators of Regulatory Conditions in the Professional Services, available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/19/42220487.xls (spreadsheet) (at “Read me” tab). 
 38. Section 140(3) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) requires a director of an 
incorporated legal practice to implement and maintain “appropriate management systems.” 
See generally OFFICE OF THE LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER, http://www.lawlink.
nsw.gov.au/olsc (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 39. See, e.g., Steve Mark, Regulating for Professionalism:  The New South Wales 
Approach, OFF. LEGAL SERVICES COMM’R (2010), http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/
lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/Regulating_for_Professionalism_ABA_Conference_August
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Since the adoption of the U.K. Act, there have been a number of 
influential British reports that have focused on regulation of the legal 
profession.  For example, in 2009, the Law Society of England and Wales 
commissioned two reports.  The “Smedley Report” recommended that the 
U.K. Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) separately regulate law firms 
representing sophisticated corporate clients.41  Smedley also recommended 
that certain principles might be applied differently to these firms.  The 
“Hunt Report” took a broader approach and responded to certain of 
Smedley’s proposals.42
The SRA has issued an almost overwhelming number of consultations 
that address issues related to both the theory of the regulation of the legal 
profession, as well as specific issues.
  Where Smedley recommended that a separate 
division of the SRA should regulate firms providing certain kinds of 
corporate legal work, Hunt recommended a unified approach as a long-term 
target. 
43  The Bar Standards Board (BSB) 
has also issued consultations about issues related to the regulation of 
barristers.44
The U.K. Legal Services Board, which is now the overarching regulator 
of legal professionals in the United Kingdom, also has commissioned a 
number of studies.
 
45  These studies include, for example, a report on 
regulatory objectives.46  The number and breadth of these reports is 
breathtaking.47
 
2010.pdf/$file/Regulating_for_Professionalism_ABA_Conference_August2010.pdf. See 
generally Speeches and Papers, OFF. LEGAL SERVICES COMM’R, http://www.lawlink.
nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/pages/OLSC_speeches (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 
 40. See, e.g., Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon, & Steve Mark, Regulating Law Firm 
Ethics Management:  An Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal 
Profession in New South Wales, 3 J.L. & SOC’Y 466 (2010). 
 41. See generally NICK SMEDLEY, REVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE LEGAL 
WORK (Mar. 31, 2009), available at http://www.lawcentres.org.uk/uploads/Review_of_the_
Regulation_of_Corporate_Legal_Work_03.09_.pdf. 
 42. See RT HON LORD HUNT OF WIRRAL MBE, THE HUNT REVIEW OF THE REGULATION 
OF LEGAL SERVICES (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.lawcentres.org.uk/uploads/Legal_
Regulation_Report_October_2009.pdf. 
 43. See, e.g., Closed Consultations, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.sra.org.uk/
sra/consultations/consultations-closed.page (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  In our view, it is 
hard to believe that any single person can monitor all of the consultations and respond 
appropriately. 
 44. See Closed Consultations, B. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.barstandardsboard.
org.uk/about-bar-standards-board/consultations/closed-consultations/ (last visited Apr. 21, 
2012).  For example, the BSB has issued consultations on regulating entities and 
implications on regulation of the 2007 Legal Services Act. Id. 
 45. See, e.g., Publications, LEGAL SERVICES BOARD, http://www.legalservicesboard.org.
uk/news_publications/publications/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 46. See The Regulatory Objectives:  Legal Services Act 2007, LEGAL SERVICES BOARD, 
http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/publications/pdf/regulatory_objecti
ves.pdf. 
 47. See, e.g., Latest News, LEGAL SERVICES BOARD, http://www.legalservicesboard.
org.uk/news_publications/latest_news/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  As of April 
21, 2012, the Legal Services Board’s “news” webpage listed more than one-hundred items, a 
number of which were announcements of reports or studies on a wide range of topics. Id. 
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These U.K. consultations and reports have generated great interest 
outside the United Kingdom.  For example, a publication of the American 
Bar Association Section of International Law has reported on the Hunt and 
Smedley reports and other U.K. developments.48  The Hunt and Smedley 
reports have been mentioned at a number of conferences we have attended.  
Moreover, although we are not familiar with all of the details of all of the 
consultations and reports that the LSB has commissioned, we can attest to 
the thoughtfulness of at least some of these reports and their close 
examination of the theory of lawyer regulation.49
The United Kingdom is not the only country that has issued reports in the 
past five years examining legal profession regulation.  In Canada, the 
Yukon Law Society has issued a lengthy discussion paper that considers 
whether to amend the Yukon legal profession act.
 
50  In Australia, there have 
been a number of reports that consider how legal profession regulation 
could be amended.51
In addition to these reports and studies, there appears to be increased 
academic interest in the theory of lawyer regulation.  Commentators such as 
Professor Gillian Hadfield and others have been influential.  Conferences 
such as “Future Ed,”
 
52 the International Legal Ethics Conferences I–V,53 
the May 2009 Conference for the Conference of Chief Justices,54 and the 
conferences sponsored by Harvard and Georgetown,55
 
 48. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry et al., Transnational Legal Practice 2009, 44 INT’L LAW. 
563, 566–67 (2010). 
 among others, have 
 49. See, e.g., Decker & Yarrow, supra note 12; Laurel S. Terry, Understanding the 
Economic Rationale for Legal Services Regulation:  The Importance of Interdisciplinary 
Dialogue, in UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR LEGAL SERVICES REGULATION:  
A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 11 (2011), available at http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/
news_publications/latest_news/pdf/economics_of_legal_services_regulation_discussion_pap
ers_publication_final.pdf. 
 50. See Toward a New Legal Profession Act:  A Discussion Paper, LAW SOC’Y YUKON 
(May 12, 2011) [hereinafter Yukon Discussion Paper], available at http://www.
lawsocietyyukon.com/forms/towardanewlegalprofessionact.pdf. 
 51. See the various discussion papers from the National Legal Profession Reform 
Taskforce at Background to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) National Legal 
Profession Reform, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T, http://www.ag.gov.
au/Consultationsreformsandreviews/Pages/BackgroundtotheCouncilofAustralianGovernment
s(COAG)NationalLegalProfessionReform.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 52. See, e.g., Future Ed:  New Business Models for U.S. and Global Legal Education, 
N.Y. L. SCH., http://www.nyls.edu/centers/harlan_scholar_centers/institute_for_information_
law_and_policy/events/future_ed (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 53. See, e.g., International Legal Ethics Conference IV, STANFORD L. SCH., 
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/ilec4/2009/10/15/hello-world/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); 
Conferences, INT’L ASSOC. OF LEGAL ETHICS, http://www.stanford.edu/group/lawlibrary/cgi-
bin/iaole/wordpress/conferences/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (includes links to information 
about ILEC I–V). 
 54. See, e.g., The Future Is Here:  Globalization and the Regulation of the Legal 
Profession, ABA CENTER FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY AND STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L 
DISCIPLINE & GEORGETOWN CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2009), 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/documents/CCJ-2009-WebMaterials-final.doc. 
 55. See, e.g., Center for the Study of the Legal Profession, GEO L., 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalProfession/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); Globalization 
of the Legal Profession, HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/plp/pages/
globalization_conference.php (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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raised numerous issues related to lawyer regulation.  Thus, when 
considering the regulatory objectives discussed in Part II (and the 
recommendations in Parts III and IV), it is helpful to understand that they 
have been adopted against the backdrop of increased discussion of the 
nature of regulation generally and the regulation of the legal profession 
specifically. 
II.  EXAMPLES OF REGULATORY OBJECTIVES FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
This part examines regulatory objectives that have been adopted in 
England and Wales, Scotland, Canada, New Zealand, and Denmark.  It also 
examines the proposals by some jurisdictions, including Australia, India, 
and Ireland, to include regulatory objectives in their legislation regulating 
the legal profession.  The intent of this part is to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the consistent and yet varied approaches to the topic of 
legal profession regulatory objectives. 
A.  Jurisdictions that Have Already Adopted Regulatory Objectives 
for the Legal Profession 
1.  England and Wales 
As noted above, the United Kingdom provides one of the most prominent 
examples of regulatory objectives for the legal profession.  These 
objectives, which are found in section 1 of the 2007 U.K. Legal Services 
Act, are as follows: 
(1) In this Act a reference to “the regulatory objectives” is a reference to 
the objectives of— 
(a) protecting and promoting the public interest; 
(b) supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law; 
(c) improving access to justice; 
(d) protecting and promoting the interests of consumers; 
(e) promoting competition in the provision of services within 
subsection (2); 
(f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal 
profession; 
(g) increasing public understanding of the citizen’s legal rights and 
duties; 
(h) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional 
principles.56
The regulatory objectives espoused in the U.K. Act are not set out in any 
particular order, and the U.K. Act does not specify how these objectives and 
 
 
 56. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2007/29/part/1.  The professional principles referred to in section 1(h) are defined 
in section 1(3). Id. § 1(3).  It is beyond the scope of this Article to compare the professional 
principles found in different jurisdictions. 
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principles should be balanced in the event they conflict with one another.  
The Explanatory Note that accompanied the legislation stated that “[t]he 
Legal Services Board, the Office for Legal Complaints and the approved 
regulators will be best placed to consider how competing objectives are to 
be balanced in a particular instance.”57  The Legal Services Board has 
agreed with this interpretation.58
The inclusion of regulatory objectives in the U.K. Act marked a 
fundamental change in the United Kingdom’s legal profession regulation.  
The move to include regulatory objectives was bold and, as noted below, 
there was considerable debate about the particular objectives to include.  
The adoption of regulatory objectives had been one of the key points in the 
recommendations and report prepared by Sir David Clementi,
 
59 which was 
a major impetus behind the U.K. Act.60  Because there had been debate 
about the draft regulatory objectives he circulated,61
 
 57. See id., Explanatory Note, Section 1:  The Regulatory Objectives, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/notes/division/7/1. 
 Clementi concluded 
that it would be more sensible to have Parliament write detailed regulatory 
 58. See The Regulatory Objectives:  Legal Services Act 2007, supra note 46, at 2 (“The 
regulatory objectives are not set out in any hierarchy in the Act.  Indeed, any attempt to 
weight or rank them would be doomed to failure by the significant overlap and interplay 
between them.”). 
 59. See DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL 
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES:  FINAL REPORT (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.legal-services-review.org.uk/
content/report/report-chap.pdf (archived content).  For additional information on the history 
of the U.K. Act, see also Judith Maute, Bar Associations, Self-Regulation and Consumer 
Protection:  Whither Thou Goest?, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 53; History of the Reforms, LEGAL 
SERVICES BOARD, http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/about_us/history_reforms/index.htm 
(last visited April 21, 2012). 
 60. See, e.g., Catherine Fairbairn, Research Paper 07/48:  Legal Services Bill [HL] Bill 
108 of 2006-07, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY 8–9 (May 29, 2007), 
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP07-48.pdf.  Clementi was asked to recommend 
a framework that would be “independent in representing the public and consumer interest, 
comprehensive, accountable, consistent, flexible, transparent, and no more restrictive or 
burdensome than is clearly justified.” See CLEMENTI, supra note 59, at 1.  His assignment 
followed the issuance of several reports by the Office of Fair Trading on Competition in 
Professional Services and the issuance of a white paper and follow-up reports by the 
Department of Constitutional Affairs. See Publications, LEGAL SERVICES REV., 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.legal-services-review.org.uk/
content/pubs.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (archived content). 
 61. Clementi had circulated a consultation report in March 2004, in which he sought 
public comment on a number of issues, including six regulatory objectives. David Clementi, 
Consultation Paper on the Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in 
England and Wales, LEGAL SERVICES REV. (Mar. 2004), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/+/http://www.legal-services-review.org.uk/content/consult/review.htm (archived 
content).  Clementi’s December 2004 Final Report summarized the comments received in 
response to his six proposed regulatory objectives and his reactions to those comments. 
CLEMENTI, supra note 59, at 15–20.  The six objectives set forth in the report were:  (1) 
maintaining the rule of law; (2) access to justice; (3) protection and promotion of consumer 
interests; (4) promotion of competition; (5) encouragement of a confident, strong and 
effective legal profession; and (6) promoting public understanding of the citizen’s legal 
rights. Id.; see also Terry, supra note 30. 
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objectives, rather than attempting to resolve the issue in his Final Report.62  
He did, however, observe that the six objectives set forth in his Report 
could “provide the core around which a regulatory framework for legal 
services can be built.”63
In May 2006, following the issuance of a governmental white paper,
 
64 
the Department of Constitutional Affairs presented a draft Legal Services 
Bill to Parliament.65  This bill omitted what is now the first regulatory 
objective in the U.K. Act, “protecting and promoting the public interest.”66  
The draft bill also omitted the word “independent” from what is now 
objective (f), “encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective 
legal profession.”67
The draft bill was reviewed by a joint House of Commons and House of 
Lords Committee, which issued a lengthy report.
 
68  This Committee noted 
the shift in emphasis from public interest to consumer interest, and 
therefore recommended a change in the regulatory objectives to explicitly 
reference public interest along with the interests of consumers; it also 
recommended adding the word “independent” when describing the legal 
profession.69  This Committee also recommended that the principles be 
expanded to include a lawyer’s duty to the court.70
 
 62. CLEMENTI, supra note 
  When the draft bill was 
introduced in the House of Lords, the regulatory objectives had been 
59, at 20 (“[A] number of respondents have proposed minor 
changes to the regulatory objectives set out in the Consultation Paper and to the text which 
supports each objective.  However, it has not been the intention of this Chapter to draft 
precisely the necessary objectives.  The precise wording of statutory objectives would be 
subject to detailed analysis by Parliamentary draftsmen, and subsequent examination by 
Parliament itself.  Whilst I do not believe it sensible to attempt that detailed analysis here, I 
do believe that the six objectives set out in this Chapter can provide the core around which a 
regulatory framework for legal services can be built.”). 
 63. Id. 
 64. U.K. DEP’T CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES:  PUTTING 
CONSUMERS FIRST (2005), available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/
cm66/6679/6679.pdf.  This paper briefly sets forth seven regulatory objectives that it 
expected would be included in the legislation: 
1) to support the rule of law; 2) to improve access to justice; 3) to protect and 
promote consumers’ interests; 4) to promote competition; 5) to encourage a strong 
and effective legal profession; 6) to increase public understanding of the citizen’s 
legal rights; and 7) to maintain the principles of those providing legal services 
(independence, integrity, the duty to act in the best interests of the client, and client 
confidentiality). 
Id. at 20.  The seventh item was not included in Clementi’s list. See supra note 61. 
 65. See DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, DRAFT LEGAL SERVICES BILL, 
EXPLANATORY NOTES AND REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1–2 (2006), available at 
http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm68/6839/6839.pdf. 
 66. Id. at 1. 
 67. Id.  The original bill also omitted two principles that appear in the U.K. Act:  
maintaining proper standards of work, and complying with the duty to the court to act with 
independence in the interests of justice. Compare id. at 1(3), with Legal Services Act, 2007, 
c. 29, § 1(3) (U.K.). 
 68. See HOUSE OF COMMONS & HOUSE OF LORDS, JOINT COMM. ON THE DRAFT LEGAL 
SERV. BILL, DRAFT LEGAL SERVICES BILL (July 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtlegal/232/232i.pdf. 
 69. See id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
 70. See id. ¶ 3. 
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revised to partially respond to these Joint Committee recommendations.71  
The House of Lords bill included the word “independent” when describing 
the desired legal profession, but did not include “protecting the public 
interest” as one of the regulatory objectives.72  There were a number of 
debates in the House of Lords and its committees about the proper role of 
the regulatory objectives, whether to amend the draft regulatory objectives, 
whether to set priorities among the objectives, and who would have the 
primary obligation to enforce them.73
 
 71. See Legal Services Bill, 2006-7, H.L. Bill [9] (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldbills/009/2007009a.pdf; see also 
Legal Services Bill 2006–07, PARLIAMENT, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
pabills/200607/legal_services.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (includes links to all drafts of 
the bill); Fairbairn, supra note 
  Some of these efforts were 
60, at summary (“The Bill as introduced in the House of 
Lords incorporated a number of amendments designed to address concerns raised by the 
Joint Committee which scrutinised the draft Bill.  It has since been amended considerably 
during its passage through the House of Lords.  Many of the amendments made were 
Government amendments tabled to meet concerns expressed during the Lords stages of the 
Bill.  For example, the Bill now includes a regulatory objective of protecting and promoting 
the public interest . . . .”). 
 72. See Legal Services Bill, 2006-7, H.L. Bill [67] cl. 1 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldbills/067/2007067a.pdf. 
 73. The bill went through three “readings” and several committee sessions in the House 
of Lords. See, e.g., Legal Services Act Explanatory Note, supra note 57, at 81–82 (Hansard 
references show the progression of the bill); see also Fairbairn, supra note 60 (describing the 
history of the bill); Influencing Law:  Legal Services Bill, LAW SOC’Y ENGLAND & WALES 
(Dec. 6, 2006) http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/influencinglaw/currentbillactivity/view=
billarticle.law?BILLID=313755. 
  While the bill was in committee, there were three proposals to amend the regulatory 
objectives.  Two of the proposed amendments were either not moved or withdrawn.  Many 
of these debates and amendments are summarized in a report prepared by the House of 
Commons Library. See Fairbairn, supra note 60, at 73 (summarizing one of the successful 
amendments in which “the threshold for intervention by the LSB has been raised:  it is now 
provided . . . [that to be overturned, an act or omission] would have, or would be likely to 
have, ‘a significant adverse impact on the regulatory objectives taken as a whole’ (rather 
than, as originally provided, an adverse impact on one or more of the regulatory 
objectives)”).  The Law Society of England and Wales was among those who urged that the 
regulatory objectives section be amended to indicate that some objectives took priority over 
others. See, e.g., LAW SOC’Y OF ENGLAND & WALES, PARLIAMENTARY BRIEF, LAW SOCIETY’S 
SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS WITH BRIEFINGS (1ST TRANCHE) (Jan.–Feb. 2007), available at 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/secure/file/163319/e:/teamsite-deployed/documents/
templatedata/Internet%20Documents/Parliamentary%20briefings/Documents/LSbillcommitt
ee1tranchefeb07.pdf.  The Law Society offered the following explanation: 
The Law Society recognises that it would not be appropriate to seek to provide a 
strict hierarchy between the seven objectives set out in the Bill.  Nevertheless, 
some of the objectives are clearly of fundamental importance, whilst others—
though desirable, all things being equal—should not be pursued at the expense of 
those more fundamental objectives.  In particular, it is important that a desire to 
foster competition is not pursued at the expense of supporting the rule of law, 
improving access to justice, or protecting and promoting the interests of 
consumers. . . .  The suggested amendment is intended to ensure that—whilst 
retaining the promotion of competition in the provision of services as a regulatory 
objective—it is made explicitly subordinate to the objectives of supporting the rule 
of law, improving access to justice, and protecting and promoting the interests of 
consumers. 
Id. at 2.  As set forth in the Explanatory Note, supra note 57, both the House of Lords and 
House of Commons rejected the idea of setting priorities among the regulatory objectives. 
2012] REGULATORY OBJECTIVES 2701 
successful:  the bill adopted by the House of Lords included for the first 
time what is now the first regulatory objective, protecting and promoting 
the public interest.74  After the bill was passed by the House of Lords, the 
House of Commons began its consideration of the issues.75  Once again, 
there was significant discussion and debate, including a proposal to set 
priorities among the regulatory objectives.76  Ultimately, however, the 
House of Commons approved the same language in section 1 that had been 
approved by the House of Lords.77  This language became section 1 of the 
U.K. Act, which received royal assent on October 30, 2007.78
As Parts III and IV explain in greater detail, we believe that the 
regulatory objectives in the U.K. Act will educate consumers and the 
profession about the purpose and function of the legislation and of 
regulators.  These regulatory objectives also underscore the need to promote 
the rule of law, provide consumer protection, and ensure access to justice, 
which are objectives that are not always readily understood as being a 
purpose of legal profession regulation.  While the objective that focuses on 
competition has been somewhat controversial, the underlying goal—
encouraging greater access to justice—is a laudable one. 
  This 
legislative history and the amendments that were adopted illustrate the 
value of having a rigorous debate about the content of any regulatory 
objectives, because important objectives may inadvertently be omitted, and 
because views differ about which objectives are appropriate. 
 
  During the debates on January 9, 2007, three amendments were proposed.  The 
proposed amendments were to:  (1) add the clause:  “protecting and promoting the public 
interest” as a regulatory objective; (2) add the words “the public interests and” after the word 
“promoting” in section (1)(d) of the final bill; and (3) insert “subject to the objectives in 
paragraphs (a) to (c)” at the beginning of section (1)(d) of the final bill. 688 PARL. DEB., 
H.L. (5th ser.) (2007) 116–30.  Only the first one of these amendments was included in the 
final version of the bill that the House of Lords passed on May 15, 2007. See Fairbairn, 
supra note 60, at 3–4; Legal Services Bill, 2006-7, H.L. Bill [67] cl. 1 (U.K.). 
 74. See Fairbairn, supra note 60, at 3–4; Legal Services Bill, 2006-7, H.L. Bill [67] cl. 1. 
 75. The Bill was introduced in the House of Commons as Legal Services Bill, 2006-7, 
H.C. Bill [108] cl. 1, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/
cmbills/108/2007108a.pdf. 
 76. A similar amendment to that proposed in the House of Lords was proposed in the 
House of Commons’s committee. See Fairbairn, supra note 60, at 3–4.  Mr. Djanogly 
proposed to insert after section (e) the clause “subject to objectives (a) to (d).” See 12 Jun. 
2007, PARL. DEB., H.L. (2007) 7 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm200607/cmpublic/legal/070612/am/70612s01.htm.  The following was offered as the 
reason for the proposal:  “That would ensure that the objective of promoting competition is 
expressly subordinate to the objectives of protecting and promoting the public interest, 
thereby supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law, improving access to justice 
and protecting and promoting the interests of consumers.” Id. 
 77. See 12 Jun. 2007, PARL. DEB., H.L. (2007) 15 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmpublic/legal/070612/am/70612s01.h
tm (showing a 5–10 committee rejection of the amendment).  Compare the House of Lords 
bill, Legal Services Bill, 2006-7, H.L. Bill [67] cl. 1 (U.K.), with the version that was 
ultimately enacted, Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1 (U.K.). 
 78. See, e.g., Legal Services Act Explanatory Note, supra note 57, at 81–82. 
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2.  Scotland 
The U.K. Act explicitly states that it applies to the legal professions in 
England and Wales, but not in Scotland and Northern Ireland.79  In 2010, 
Scotland passed its own legal services act.80  The debate in Scotland was 
particularly heated, especially on the issue of alternative business 
structures.81
The regulatory objectives in the Scottish legislation are found in section 1 
of the Legal Services (Scotland) Act 2010.
  The regulatory objectives section, however, changed very 
little as it went through the legislative process. 
82  The regulatory objectives 
section in the original Scottish bill had a different format from the U.K. 
Act, but much of its content was similar.83  During the amendment process, 
the Justice Committee approved an amendment to add “the interest of 
justice” to the first objective,84
 
 79. See Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 195 (U.K.); id. at Schedule 20; id. at 
Explanatory Notes:  Territorial Extent, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2007/29/notes/division/3; see also Frequently Asked Questions, LEGAL SERVICES 
BOARD, http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/can_we_help/faqs/index.htm (last visited Apr. 
21, 2012).  
 but rejected a proposal to set priorities 
 80. See Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2010/16/pdfs/asp_20100016_en.pdf; Richard Hough, 
Legal Services (Scotland) Bill, SPICE BRIEFING, http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/
SPICeResources/Research%20briefings%20and%20fact%20sheets/SB09-78.pdf. 
 81. See, e.g., Hough, supra note 80, at 1. 
 82. Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1.  This section provides: 
For the purposes of this Act, the regulatory objectives are the objectives of— 
(a) supporting— 
(i) the constitutional principle of the rule of law, 
(ii) the interests of justice, 
(b) protecting and promoting— 
(i) the interests of consumers, 
(ii) the public interest generally, 
(c) promoting— 
(i) access to justice, 
(ii) competition in the provision of legal services, 
(d) promoting an independent, strong, varied and effective legal profession, 
(e) encouraging equal opportunities (as defined in Section L2 of Part II of 
Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998) within the legal profession, 
(f) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles. 
Id. 
 83. Compare Legal Services (Scotland) Bill, 2010, [as introduced], http://www.scottish.
parliament.uk/S3_Bills/Legal%20Services%20(Scotland)%20Bill/b30s3-introd.pdf, with 
Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (U.K.). 
 84. See 8 June 2010, Justice Committee Official Report (2010) 3182 (Scot.), available at 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/28862.aspx?r=5552&mode=html. 
The original version read: 
(a) supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law, 
(b) protecting and promoting— 
(i) the interests of consumers, 
(ii) the public interest generally, 
(c) promoting— 
(i) access to justice, 
(ii) competition in the provision of legal services, 
(d) promoting an independent, strong, varied and effective legal profession, 
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among the objectives.85  Both of these Committee actions were affirmed by 
Parliament.86  Parliament approved the final bill in October and it received 
Royal Assent on November 9, 2010.87  Although the objectives Scotland 
adopted are not identical to those adopted in the United Kingdom, there is 
substantial overlap among them.  There are also some potentially important 
differences.88  Similar to the U.K. Act, Scotland’s regulatory objectives 
refer to professional principles.89
3.  Canada 
 
Canadian lawyers are primarily regulated on a provincial rather than a 
national basis.90
 
(e) encouraging equal opportunities (as defined in Section L2 of Part II of 
Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998) within the legal profession, 
  All of the Canadian provinces except Quebec have 
language in their legal profession acts that might be described as regulatory 
objectives provisions, even though none of these jurisdictions uses the term 
(f) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles. 
Legal Services (Scotland) Bill [as introduced] § 1, supra note 83. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Compare Legal Services (Scotland) Bill [as amended at stage 2], available at 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3_bills/Legal%20Services%20(Scotland)%20Bill/b30as3
-stage2.pdf, with Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16). See generally 6 Oct. 2010 
PARL. DEB. (2010) 29251 (Scot.), available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/
parliamentarybusiness/28862.aspx?r=5811&mode=html.  It should be noted, however, that 
the Committee recommended placing the “interests of justice” language in a different spot 
than where it appeared in the final bill. Id. 
 87. See Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16) (noting the date of passage and 
the date of Royal Assent). 
 88. Compare id., with Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1 (U.K.).  Both of these are 
reproduced in Appendix 2, infra.  The differences among the U.K. and Scottish objectives 
include the following:  (1) the Scottish Act refers to protecting and promoting the public 
interest generally, whereas the U.K. Act omits the word “generally”; (2) the Scottish Act 
adds “supporting the interests of justice” to the objective about supporting the constitutional 
principle of the rule of law; (3) the Scottish act seeks to “promote” access to justice, whereas 
the U.K. Act aims to “improve” access to justice; (4) the Scottish Act refers to promoting a 
“varied” legal profession whereas the U.K. Act speaks of promoting a “diverse” legal 
profession; (5) the Scottish Act omits the objective of increasing public understanding of the 
citizen’s legal rights and duties; and (6) the Scottish Act includes a provision not found in 
the U.K. Act, which is “encouraging equal opportunities.”  The first four differences listed 
above may simply be semantic, or they may have other more substantive interpretations that 
only time will divulge.  The final two points may have a more considerable effect.  The 
objective encouraging equal opportunity may limit the Scottish approach in terms of 
education to the rather narrow but important issue of gender equality within the profession. 
 89. See Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 2.  Scotland’s principles 
have a different format and some differing content than the U.K. principles, but there is still 
a significant amount of overlap between Scotland’s and the U.K. Act’s professional 
principles Compare id., with supra note 56 (referring to the professional principles in the 
U.K. Legal Services Act). 
 90. See infra Appendix 2.  Canada has ten provinces and three territories.  The ten 
Provinces include Alberta; British Columbia; Manitoba; New Brunswick; Newfoundland 
and Labrador; Nova Scotia; Ontario; Prince Edward Island; Quebec; and Saskatchewan.  The 
three territories are Nunavut, Northwest Territories, and the Yukon. See Provinces and 
Territories, CAN. PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia/index.asp?lang=eng
&page=provterr.  
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“regulatory objectives.”91  One of the three Canadian territories has 
language that is directly analogous to regulatory objectives; the remaining 
two territories have “purpose” language embedded somewhere in their legal 
profession acts but not at the outset.92
Although most of the Canadian provinces and territories have language 
that might be considered to be regulatory objectives language, the language 
that is used is not uniform.  For example, some of these Canadian 
jurisdictions have regulatory objectives language that is quite detailed, 
located near the beginning of their acts, and similar in many respects to 
section 1(1) of the U.K. Act.
 
93  Others, however, have very broad language 
that is not located near the beginning of the act and thus does not establish 
the framework for what follows, in contrast with section 1 of the U.K. 
Act.94
The regulatory objectives-like section of the British Columbia and Yukon 
Legal Profession Acts are identical to each other.  Substantially similar 
language is found in the legal profession acts of New Brunswick and Prince 
Edward Island.
  Some of these regulatory objectives provisions are of relatively 
recent origin, such as Saskatchewan’s regulatory objectives, which were 
added in 2010; Ontario’s, which were amended in 2006; and the Yukon’s 
regulatory objectives, which were amended in 2004. 
95
It is the object and duty of the society 
  They state as follows: 
(a) to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice 
by 
(i) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons, 
(ii) ensuring the independence, integrity and honour of its members, 
and 
 
 91. See infra Appendix 2.  As this Appendix shows, the nine Provinces that have such 
language are Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan.  Quebec, of course, is in a 
different situation because it is a civil law, French-speaking jurisdiction and has different 
kinds of legal professionals, such as notaries, than the other Canadian provinces.  It appears 
that the Act respecting the Barreau du Québec does not contain any objectives language. See 
R.S.Q., c. B-1 (Can.) (last revised Aug. 11, 2012), http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.
qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=%2F%2FB_1%2FB1_A.htm.  But the 
overarching Code of the Professions, which is administered by the Office des professions du 
Québec, includes “objectives” language. See Professional Code, R.S.Q., c. C-26 (Can.), 
available at http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?
type=2&file=/C_26/C26_A.HTM.  That Office’s webpage also includes objectives-type 
language. See Ordres Professionels, OFFICE DES PROFESSIONS QUÉBEC, http://www.opq.gouv.
qc.ca/ordres-professionnels/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 92. See Legal Profession Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1998, c. L-2, pt. 3, § 22 (Can.) (last revised 
May 19, 2011); Legal Profession Act, R.S.N.W.T. (Nun.) 1988, c. L-2, § 22(2]; S. Nu. 2010, 
c. 14, § 10; S. Nu. 2011, c. 6, §.15; S. Nu. 2011, c. 11, s.1; Legal Profession Act, R.S.Y. 
2002, c. 134, amended by S.Y. 2004, c. 14, §§ 1–31; S.Y. 2008, c. 7, § 3; S.Y. 2010, c. 4, §. 
8 (Can.). 
 93. See, e.g., Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, pt. 1, § 4.2 (Can.). 
 94. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, pt. 3, § 49(1) (Can.). 
 95. See supra note 91 and accompanying text; infra Appendix 2 (discussing the 
regulatory objectives sections of these acts). 
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(iii) establishing standards for the education, professional 
responsibility and competence of its members and applicants for 
membership, and 
(b) subject to paragraph (a), 
(i) to regulate the practice of law, and 
(ii) to uphold and protect the interests of its members.96
The other provinces have language that overlaps some of the language 
found in these four provinces, but there are also some significant 
differences.
 
97  For example, Alberta, the Northwest Territories, and 
Nunavut regulate conduct that “tends to harm the standing of the legal 
profession generally.”98  Nova Scotia says that one of the purposes of the 
Law Society is to address “the circumstances of members of the Society 
requiring assistance in the practice of law, and in handling or avoiding 
personal, emotional, medical or substance abuse problems.”99  In Ontario, 
the Law Society has a duty to act in a “timely, open and efficient manner” 
when carrying out its functions.100
This latter regulatory objective is noteworthy because it sets forth “good 
regulation” objectives in addition to objectives that are specific to the legal 
profession.  In the future, support may increase for this type of general 
regulatory principle.
 
101
 
 96. Compare British Columbia Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, pt. 1, § 3 (Can.) 
(under the title “Public Interest Paramount”), with Legal Profession Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 134, 
pt. 1, § 3 (Can.) (under the title “Duty of the society”).  The relevant language in New 
Brunswick and Prince Edward Island is substantially similar to this British Columbia/Yukon 
language.  The New Brunswick Act uses a different format, in which these six ideas are 
listed as six subsections, rather than divided into two sections. Law Society Act, S.N.B. 
1996, c. 89 (Can.).  It also uses different verb forms such as “to preserve” rather than 
“preserving.” Id.  The only differences that arguably are significant are that British Columbia 
and the Yukon refer to the regulation of the “practice of law,” whereas New Brunswick 
refers to regulating the legal profession. See Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2674–
77  nn.
  For example, when the antitrust section of the 
Canadian government wrote its report about regulation of the legal 
67–78 and accompanying text (noting that regulators must decide whether to regulate 
services or providers; although in the past there was a strong overlap between services and 
providers since lawyers were the primary source of legal services, that is no longer true).  A 
second noteworthy difference is that section 3(b) in the Yukon and British Columbia Acts 
make the objective of the regulation of the practice of law and the objective of protecting the 
interests of its members subject to the other objectives, whereas New Brunswick does not 
contain this caveat.  Similar to the New Brunswick Act, Prince Edward Island’s Legal 
Profession Act, S.P.E.I. 1992, c. L-6.1 (Can.), omits the caveat found in the British 
Columbia and Yukon Acts that regulation and protecting the interests of its members are 
subject to the other objectives.  The Prince Edward Island Act is also noteworthy because it 
identifies five rather than six objectives, omitting the objective “to preserve and protect the 
rights and freedoms of all persons.” Id. 
 97. See infra Appendix 2 (setting forth the text of the regulatory objectives provisions 
found in the Canadian provinces and territories). 
 98. See Alberta Legal Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, pt. 3, § 49(1)(b) (Can.); 
Northwest Territories Legal Profession Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1998, c. L-2, pt. 3, § 22(b) (Can.); 
Legal Profession Act, R.S.N.W.T. (Nun.) 1988, c. L-2, § 22(2)(b) (Can.). 
 99. See Legal Profession Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 28, pt. 3, § 33(d) (Can.). 
 100. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, pt. 1, § 4.2(4) (Can.). 
 101. Australia’s Draft Legal Profession National Law similarly includes among its 
objectives general regulatory principles. See infra notes 129–35 and accompanying text. 
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profession, one of the first chapters in that report was devoted to general 
regulatory principles.102  The provincial governments in Ontario, Manitoba, 
and Nova Scotia each have legislation that applies to the legal profession 
(and other professions) and includes this type of general regulatory 
objectives.103  All three of these provincial provisions require “fairness, 
openness and transparency” in the admission processes of a number of 
regulated professions.104  This legislation was controversial because it 
introduced a new level of government oversight over all professions.105
In general, it does not appear that Canada’s regulatory objectives-like 
language has been subject to much debate, as was true in Scotland and the 
United Kingdom.
 
106  There is, however, increasing interest in this topic.107  
For the most part, the Canadian debates appear to have focused on whether 
to retain objectives that refer to the interests of the legal profession.108
 
 102. See CANADIAN COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 
 
2.  It should be noted that the 
Competition Bureau appears to have closed its inquiry into the self-regulated professions. 
See Self-Regulated Professions—Post-Study Assessment, COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA, 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03407.html (last visited Apr. 21, 
2012). 
 103. See, e.g., The Fair Registration Practices in Regulated Professions Act, C.C.S.M. 
2006-7, pt. 2, § 4 (“A regulated profession has a duty to provide registration practices that 
are transparent, objective, impartial and fair.”); Fair Access to Regulated Professions and 
Compulsory Trades Act, 2006, R.S.O. 2006, c. 31, § 6, amended by S.O. 2009, c. 22, §§ 97 
(1), 104 (1) (same); Fair Registration Practices Act 2008, S.N.S. 2008, c. 38, § 6 (similar). 
 104. See supra note 103. 
 105. See, e.g., E-mail from Darrel Pink, Exec. Dir., Nova Scotia Law Society, to Laurel S. 
Terry (Oct. 15, 2011) (on file with author). 
 106. See, e.g., E-mail from Don Thompson, Exec. Dir., Law Society of Alberta, to Laurel 
S. Terry (Sept. 20, 2011) (on file with author); E-mail from Malcolm L. Heins, Chief Exec. 
Officer, Law Society of Upper Canada, to Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 17, 2011) (on file with 
author) (indicating that there had been little issue when Ontario amended its objectives since 
they largely mirrored the law society’s role or purpose statement and its commentary from 
1994); E-mail from Marilyn Billinkoff, Exec. Dir., Law Society of Manitoba, to Laurel S. 
Terry (Oct. 19, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that when the current Manitoba legal 
profession act was enacted in 2002, “the [governing body of the Law Society, which consists 
of individuals who are called] benchers recommended that a purpose statement be added.”  
The government agreed and there was no debate about the purpose.). 
 107. The Northwest Territories are considering an amendment that would spell out the 
act’s objectives more clearly. See E-mail from Linda Whitford, Exec. Dir., Law Society of 
the Northwest Territories, to Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 18, 2011) (on file with author). See 
generally Yukon Discussion Paper, supra note 50.  The Yukon Discussion Paper refers to the 
topic of regulatory objectives, and its appendix 2 sets forth the regulatory objectives in 
Canada and elsewhere in the world. Id. at app. 2.  Yukon Appendix 2, which predates this 
Article, includes not only the material found in the Appendix to this Article but “purpose” 
and “objectives” statements found on Law Society webpages.  It should be noted that the 
Appendix to this Article was derived independently from appendix 2 to the 2011 Yukon 
Discussion Paper.  Although there are many similarities, the Appendix to this Article 
includes some sections, such as Section 22 of Alberta’s Legal Profession Act, not included in 
the Yukon appendix 2. 
 108. See, e.g., E-mail from Allan Fineblit, Exec. Dir., Manitoba Law Society, to Laurel S. 
Terry (Oct. 16, 2011) (on file with author) (discussing the ultimately rejected proposal in 
Manitoba of listing the dual objective of the best interests of the legal profession in its 
governance policies); E-mail from Alan Treleaven, Dir., Education & Practice, Law Society 
of British Columbia, to Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 20, 2011) (on file with author) (“The Law 
Society of BC drafted the language, and it was accepted by the provincial legislature without 
objection.  At the Bencher meeting, the draft language provoked almost no controversy.  
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Although some Canadian provinces have far more robust, nuanced 
regulatory objectives language than other provinces,109 it may be 
misleading to assume that the absence of robust statutory language means 
that a particular law society or governing body is not concerned with the 
issue of regulatory objectives.  The Law Society of Alberta, for example, 
adopted “Mission and Vision” language to compensate for the rather “thin” 
language found in the Alberta Legal Profession Act.110
4.  New Zealand 
  While we submit 
that it is useful for regulators to adopt and publicly articulate their mission, 
vision, values, and regulatory objectives, the thesis of this Article is that the 
appropriate entity in each jurisdiction should adopt binding regulatory 
objectives. 
New Zealand provides another example of a jurisdiction that has 
legislatively adopted regulatory objectives for the legal profession.  Like 
Canada, but unlike England, Wales, and Scotland, New Zealand does not 
regulate solicitors and barristers (or advocates) separately; instead, it has a 
unified legal profession.  New Zealand is a federal system and lawyers 
originally were regulated on a district-wide basis, but this changed with the 
adoption of the national Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006111 (LCA).  
Under the LCA, the New Zealand Law Society has both regulatory and 
representative functions and powers.112
 
There was near universal acceptance that the public interest is paramount, and the debates 
have been around whether the interests of lawyers should be articulated as secondary 
(subservient) objectives, or whether there should be only reference to the public interest, to 
exclude any criticism that perhaps the objectives internally conflict.”).   
 
 109. Compare Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, § 3 (Can.), with Legal Profession 
Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, § 49(1) (Can.).  Both laws are set forth in the Appendix 2, infra. 
 110. See E-mail from Don Thompson, Exec. Dir., Law Society of Alberta, to Laurel S. 
Terry (Sept. 29, 2011) (on file with author).  Because of its focus, this Article does not 
purport to present comprehensive research on the topic of regulatory objectives or purpose 
statements found on websites. 
 111. Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (N.Z.).  The LCA went into force on August 1, 
2008. Id. § 2.  Prior to the 2006 Act and the creation of one law society, there were fourteen 
district law societies, each with its own statutory powers, operating in a federal structure 
with the New Zealand Law Society. See About Us, NEW ZEALAND L. SOC’Y, 
http://www.lawsociety.org.nz/about_us (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  The statutory role of 
districts ceased on January 31, 2009 and, with the exception of Auckland, their assets and 
liabilities were transferred to the New Zealand Law Society.  The New Zealand Law Society 
was established in 1869, but had not previously had regulatory authority.  
 112. The regulatory functions and powers of the New Zealand Law Society include 
controlling and regulating the practice of law, and assisting and promoting reform to uphold 
the rule of law and the administration of justice. Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, pt. 4, 
§ 65 (N.Z.).  The Society’s regulatory functions include issuing practicing certificates, 
maintaining a register of lawyers, making practice rules, managing the Lawyers Complaints 
Service, and operating a Fidelity Fund. Id. pt. 4, § 67.  The Society might be said to have 
“representational” functions insofar as it is directed to participate in law reform activities. Id. 
pt. 4, § 66; see also Regulatory, NEW ZEALAND L. SOC’Y, http://www.lawsociety.org.nz/
home/for_lawyers/regulatory (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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Unlike the United Kingdom and Scotland Acts, the LCA does not use the 
phrase “regulatory objectives,” but instead refers to the “purposes” of the 
Act.113
(1) The purposes of this Act are— 
  Section 3 of the New Zealand Act states:   
to maintain public confidence in the provision of legal services and 
conveyancing services[;] 
to protect the consumers of legal services and conveyancing services[;] 
to recognise the status of the legal profession and to establish the new 
profession of conveyancing practitioner.114
The Act continues by indicating methods of achieving these purposes:  
law reform relating to lawyers, providing a regulatory regime for lawyers 
and conveyancers that is “more responsive,” and ensuring that the Act states 
the “fundamental obligations with which, in the public interest, all lawyers 
and all conveyancing practitioners must comply in providing regulated 
services.”
 
115
One view of the New Zealand objectives—particularly when compared 
to the objectives mentioned above or following in relation to Australia—is 
that they are rather narrow in scope, and miss the opportunity to educate in 
relation to promoting the rule of law and client protection.  The objectives 
also fail, in our view, to promote the type of professionalism that we have 
endorsed.  This is unfortunate.  The effect of these objectives is thus rather 
limited when compared to some of the other examples. 
 
Lawyers in New Zealand are subject to several other kinds of regulatory 
instruments beyond the LCA.116
based on the fundamental obligations of lawyers, set out in section 4 of 
the Act.  These obligations include a duty to uphold the rule of law and to 
facilitate the administration of justice; a duty to be independent in 
providing regulated services to clients; a duty to act in accordance with all 
fiduciary duties and duties of care owed by lawyers to their clients; [and] 
to protect, subject to overriding duties as officers of the High Court and to 
duties under any enactment, the interests of clients.
  These instruments also emphasize the 
purpose of the regulation.  Consider, for example, the Schedule for the 
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers:  Conduct and Client Care) Rules 
2008, which specifies the conduct and client care rules as they apply to 
lawyers in New Zealand.  The rules are  
117
Interestingly, while the LCA and the rules emphasize purpose, the focus 
on purpose does not extend to those bodies that enforce the regulatory 
 
 
 113. Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, pt. 1, § 3. 
 114. Id. pt. 1, § 3(1)(a)–(c). 
 115. Id. pt. 1, § 3(2) (providing a full list of ways in which the Act purports to achieve 
these purposes). 
 116. For additional information about the types of regulatory instruments to which 
lawyers might be subject, see Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2664–66 nn.9–25. 
 117. Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers:  Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, 
Schedule. 
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framework in New Zealand.118  For example, there is no reference to aims, 
objectives, or purposes within the Constitution of the New Zealand Law 
Society.119  Similarly, there is little reference to purpose in the regulations 
that govern the Lawyers Complaint Service, the regulatory body that 
handles complaints against lawyers.120  The regulations establishing that 
entity include a very brief “purpose” statement, but do not rise to the level 
of explaining why the entity has the powers it was given.121
5.  Denmark 
 
Denmark provides another example of a jurisdiction that has adopted the 
equivalent of regulatory objectives for the legal profession.  These 
objectives appear in the bylaws of the Danish Bar and Law Society, which 
is the entity that regulates lawyers in Denmark.122
to guard the independence and integrity of lawyers; 
  The very first bylaw sets 
forth the “objects” (or purpose or regulatory objectives) of the organization: 
to ensure and enforce the discharge of the duties and obligations of 
lawyers; 
to maintain the professional skills of lawyers; and 
to work for the benefit of the Danish legal community.123
These bylaws were enacted following the 2008 judicial reforms.
 
124  
These reforms removed from the Bar and the Law Society the responsibility 
to represent the commercial interests of the profession.125
 
 118. See Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, pt. 4, §§ 65–66. 
  This separation 
of the Bar and Law Society’s regulatory and representative functions was 
 119. See generally Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers) Constitution 2008. 
 120. See generally Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers:  Complaints Service and 
Standards Committees) Regulations 2008.  The Lawyers Complaints Service was established 
in 2008 to receive complaints about current and former lawyers, incorporated and formerly 
incorporated law firms, and their current and former employees. Id. pt. 2, § 6; see, e.g., New 
Zealand Solicitors — Lawyers and Conveyancers Act of 2006, NEW ZEALAND SOLICITORS, 
http://www.advocates.co.nz/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See DANISH BAR & L. SOC’Y, THE DANISH BAR AND LAW SOCIETY 4 (2009), 
available at http://www.advokatsamfundet.dk/Service/English/Organisation/~/media/Files/
English/Danish_Bar_and_Law_Society_20091.ashx (“The Danish Bar and Law Society is 
established by law . . . and is as such recognised as an official authority under the Danish 
legal system.  However, the Society enjoys full independence from the state.  Thus, the 
Society is not a governmental authority and is not part of the public sector or the executive.  
The Society is not subject to instructions from governmental authorities and the Society 
receives no public funding.  The Society may be described as an independent, self-governing 
and self-funding public law institution comprising all lawyers.”). 
 123. Bylaws of the Danish Bar and Law Society, Adopted by the General Meeting of 
Lawyers on 25 October 2008, DANISH BAR & L. SOC’Y, http://www.advokatsamfundet.dk/
Service/English/Rules/~/media/Files/English/Vedtaegt_for_Det_Danske_Advokatsamfund_-
_08122008_eng2.ashx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 124. See, e.g., E-mail from Lise-Lotte Skovsager Gümoes, Advokat, Danish Bar and Law 
Society, to Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 12, 2011, 5:07 AM) (on file with the Fordham Law 
Review). 
 125. Id. 
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consistent not only with ongoing EU antitrust initiatives, but also with a 
report that the Law Society had itself commissioned.126  Other than that one 
change, the content found in Bylaw 1 has been largely unchanged since the 
foundation of the Bar and Law Society in 1919.127
This Danish example is interesting because it shows that regulatory 
objectives need not be confined to common law or English-speaking 
jurisdictions.  Although Denmark’s regulatory objectives are not as detailed 
as those recently adopted or proposed in English-speaking common law 
jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, Scotland, Canada, Australia, 
Ireland, and India, it shows that the concept of regulatory objectives has the 
potential to be effective in many different kinds of legal systems, and that 
the current interest in regulatory objectives is not limited to English-
speaking or common law jurisdictions.
 
128
B.  Jurisdictions that Have Drafted but Have Not Yet Adopted Regulatory 
Objectives for the Legal Profession 
 
A number of other jurisdictions also appear to have taken a keen interest 
in the use of regulatory objectives in legal profession regulation.  
Jurisdictions such as Australia, Ireland, and India have drafted regulatory 
objectives, but have not yet adopted them.  The sections that follow 
describe these proposals. 
1.  Australia 
Australia currently has a pending Draft Legal Profession National Law 
that includes a section that explicitly sets forth, for the first time, regulatory 
objectives for the legal profession.129
 
 126. See COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS, supra note 
  The draft legislation on regulatory 
objectives provides: 
32, at 3; Terry, supra note 30, at 63. 
 127. See E-mail from Lise-Lotte Skovsager Gümoes, supra note 124. 
 128. See infra note 207 and accompanying text (identifying other jurisdictions that have 
adopted “purpose” or “object” statements). 
 129. Council of Australian Governments (COAG) National Legal Profession Reform, 
LAWLINK NSW, http://www.ipc.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/corporate/ll_corporate.nsf/pages/lpr_
index (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  In early 2000, state and territory Attorneys-General, with 
the support of the Commonwealth Attorney-General, sponsored a National Legal Profession 
Model Laws Project through which the states and territories developed a Model Bill aimed at 
facilitating national legal practice and the development of the national legal services market. 
See LEGAL PROFESSION—MODEL LAWS PROJECT, MODEL BILL (2d ed.) (Aug. 24, 2006), 
available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Documents/SCAG%20Model_Bill%20August%20
2006.PDF.  The Model Bill formed the basis of new legal profession acts, which have been 
enacted in all but one jurisdiction (South Australia). See Legal Profession Act 2004 
(N.S.W.); Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT); Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic); Legal 
Profession Act 2007 (Qld); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas); Legal Profession Act 2008 
(WA).  The adoption of these model laws by all but one jurisdiction in Australia was a 
significant milestone toward achieving a consistent national regulatory framework.  
However, with the changing nature of the legal services market globally and the impact on 
the domestic legal marketplace, it had become increasingly apparent that the former legal 
profession acts were not sufficiently uniform or harmonized to support a seamless national 
legal services market and to facilitate Australia’s participation in the international legal 
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The objectives of this Law are to promote the administration of justice 
and an efficient and effective Australian legal profession, by: 
(a)  providing and promoting national consistency in the law applying to 
the Australian legal profession; and 
(b) ensuring lawyers are competent and maintain high ethical and 
professional standards in the provision of legal services; and 
(c)  enhancing the protection of clients of law practices and the protection 
of the public generally; and 
(d) empowering clients of law practices to make informed choices about 
the services they access and the costs involved; and 
(e) promoting regulation of the legal profession that is efficient, effective, 
targeted and proportionate; and 
(f) providing a co-regulatory framework within which an appropriate level 
of independence of the legal profession from the executive arm of 
government is maintained.130
The draft Australian regulatory objectives overlap in certain respects with 
the regulatory objectives found in the United Kingdom, Scotland, New 
Zealand, Canada, and Denmark, but there are some notable differences.
 
131  
Similar to some of the regulatory objectives of the other jurisdictions, the 
Australian objectives refer to the protection of clients and the protection of 
the public.  The regulatory objectives in Australia also include compliance 
with professional principles, although the Australian draft objectives add an 
explicit reference to lawyer competency.132
While many of the objectives overlap with the other jurisdictions, several 
appear to have a slightly different emphasis.  For example, whereas the 
U.K. and Scottish objectives refer to promoting “competition” in the 
provision of legal services, the draft Australian objectives refer to 
“empowering clients of law practices to make informed choices about the 
services they access and the costs involved.”
 
133
What is perhaps most unusual about Australia’s draft regulatory 
objectives, and sets them apart from those of most other jurisdictions, is the 
fact that the Australian objectives include a number of general regulatory 
principles.  For example, regulatory objective 1.1.3(e) provides that one of 
the objectives of the legislation is “promoting regulation of the legal 
profession that is efficient, effective, targeted and proportionate.”
 
134
 
services market. See Background to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
National Legal Profession Reform, supra note 
  From 
a regulator’s perspective, this provides some guidance as to the approach to 
51. 
 130. See [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Documents/National%20Legal%20Profession%20Legislation%20-
%20September%202011%20(%20for%20web%20site%20).pdf. 
 131. See supra Part II. 
 132. See [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(b). 
 133. See infra Appendix 2 (comparing the Australian, U.K., and Scottish regulatory 
objectives). 
 134. See supra note 130. 
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be taken to achieve the larger and perhaps even unstated goal of—in the 
words of Steve Mark, Legal Services Commissioner of NSW—reducing 
complaints against lawyers while promoting consumer protection and 
protection of the rule of law.135
Although certain aspects of the Australian draft regulation have been 
subject to some debate,
  This means that an effective regulator must 
have a strong educational mandate, both to the profession to improve its 
professionalism and ethical standards, as well as to members of the 
community in relation to their expectations of the legal system. 
136 the “objectives” section has not attracted much 
controversy.  One of the reasons there has been little controversy about 
including regulatory objectives in the draft legislation may be because legal 
regulators and legislative drafters in Australia already place a heavy 
emphasis on function and purpose.  All of the legislative instruments 
regulating lawyers across Australia—that is, all of the individual state and 
territory legal profession acts—set out the purpose of the legislation at the 
outset of each act.  Similarly, the state and territory-based entities that 
regulate the legal profession137
Consider, for example, the situation in New South Wales.  There, the 
legal profession is co-regulated by the Office of the Legal Services 
Commissioner (OLSC), the Law Society of NSW, and the NSW Bar 
Association.
 include purpose statements in their 
governing mandates. 
138
 
 135. See NEW S. WALES OFFICE OF THE LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R, ANNUAL REPORT 7 
(2009–2010), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/
OLSC_2009_2010_AnnRep.pdf/$file/OLSC_2009_2010_AnnRep.pdf; see also Steve Mark, 
Regulation for Professionalism, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, June 2010, at 1, available at 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/WP_Issue50_June2010.pdf/
$file/WP_Issue50_June2010.pdf; Mark, supra note 
  Since 1994, the practice of law and the legal profession has 
39. 
 136. There has been considerable debate about certain aspects of the draft National Law.  
One of the most hotly debated issues has been the composition of the National Legal 
Services Board. See NATIONAL LEGAL PROFESSION REFORM TASKFORCE, COMPOSITION AND 
APPOINTMENT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES BOARD 2–3 (2010), available at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Documents/Taskforce+paper+-+models+for+composition+of+
appointments+to+National+Board+v3+(Final)+PDF+FORMAT.pdf.  As these sources 
show, the debates have not focused on the Act’s regulatory objectives. 
 137. Australia is a federation of six states and two territories.  The practice of law is 
regulated by these individual states and territories. See Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW); 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld); Legal Profession Act 
2008 (WA); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas); Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT); Legal 
Practitioners Act 1981 (SA).  Regulation of the legal profession is based on a co-regulatory 
model involving the courts, government, and the legal profession, although the specifics of 
regulation and the split of functions varies in each jurisdiction according to its own legal, 
economic and social history, and norms.  
 138. These three entities share co-regulatory power in a system that may seem complex to 
outsiders.  The OLSC is a purely regulatory body. See About Us, OFF. LEGAL SERVICES 
COMMISSIONER, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/pages/OLSC_
aboutus (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  Its role is to resolve disputes and investigate complaints 
about professional conduct. See id.  The OLSC also oversees the investigation of complaints 
about the conduct of practitioners and plays a major role in resolving consumer disputes. See 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) pt 7.3 (Austl.).  Within part 7.3, section 688 of the Act 
sets forth the functions of the Commissioner. See id. pt 7.3, s 688. 
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been governed by two pieces of legislation created and amended by the 
government, as well as two binding codes of conduct created by the Law 
Society of New South Wales for solicitors and the New South Wales Bar 
Association for barristers.139
The Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW),
 
140 which was introduced on 
October 1, 2005, regulates legal practice in New South Wales.  It aims to 
serve the administration of justice and protect clients of law practices and 
the public generally.141  The Legal Profession Regulation 2005 augments 
the Act.142  It deals with a range of topics including admission and 
certification requirements, advertising, practice structures, trust money, and 
costs.143  The Revised Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995 
(Solicitors’ Rules) outlines the duties owed by a practitioner to clients, the 
Courts, other practitioners, and third parties.144  It also contains a section on 
legal practice.145
 
  The Law Society of New South Wales is the representative body for solicitors 
practicing within the state but it also plays a co-regulatory role with the OLSC in setting and 
enforcing professional standards, licensing solicitors to practice, investigating complaints, 
and administering “discipline to ensure that both the community and the profession are 
properly served by ethical and responsible solicitors.” See Our Role, LAW SOC’Y NEW S. 
WALES, http://www.lawsociety.com.au/about/ourrole/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  
The Law Society also offers confidential advice to members to assist them in complying 
with the Revised Professional Conduct and Practice Rules (Solicitors’ Rules) and associated 
regulations. Id.  The Law Society’s Regulatory Compliance Support Unit also assists 
practitioners in meeting the compliance requirements of the Legal Profession Act 2004. 
Regulatory Compliance, LAW SOC’Y NEW S. WALES, http://www.lawsociety.com.au/
ForSolictors/professionalstandards/RegulatorySystems/index.htm. 
  Neither the 2005 Legal Profession Regulation nor the 
Solicitors’ Rules includes the phrase “regulatory objectives.”  The Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (NSW) does, however, contain quasi-regulatory 
objectives by way of section 3, which outlines the purposes of the Act: 
  The New South Wales Bar Association was incorporated on October 22, 1936 and is 
“a voluntary association of practising barristers.” See About Us, NEW S. WALES B. ASS’N, 
http://www.nswbar.asn.au/about.php (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  The New South Wales Bar 
Association has a regulatory as well as a representational role.  As highlighted in its 
constitution, the New South Wales Bar Association seeks “to promote the administration of 
justice[;] promote, maintain and improve the interests and standards of local practising 
barristers [and] to make recommendations with respect to legislation, law reform, rules of 
court and the business and procedure of courts.” Our Aims, NEW S. WALES BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.nswbar.asn.au/docs/about/aims.php (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  The Bar 
Association’s Professional Conduct Department “facilitates the investigation and reporting 
to Bar Council of conduct complaints” that are initiated by the Bar Council or referred to the 
Council by the Legal Services Commissioner as part of the co-regulatory system. Id. 
 139. See Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW); Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW); Revised 
Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995 (Solicitors’ Rules); NSW Barristers’ Rules. 
 140. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/
nsw/consol_act/lpa2004179/. 
 141. Id. s 3. 
 142. Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
legis/nsw/consol_reg/lpr2005270/. 
 143. Id. 
 144. LAW SOC’Y OF NEW S. WALES, REVISED PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND PRACTICE 
RULES 1995 (SOLICITORS’ RULES), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/
consol_reg/lpr2005270/. 
 145. Id. Rules 37–45. 
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(a) to provide for the regulation of legal practice in this jurisdiction in the 
interests of the administration of justice and for the protection of clients of 
law practices and the public generally, 
(b) to facilitate the regulation of legal practice on a national basis across 
State and Territory borders.146
The Act, the Regulation, and the Solicitors’ Rules are enforced by three 
regulatory associations in New South Wales:  OLSC, the Law Society of 
NSW, and the NSW Bar Association.
 
147
The regulatory objectives of the OLSC are specified in all of its 
constituent documents, and are also posted on its website.
  Each of these three organizations 
has adopted their own set of regulatory objectives. 
148  These 
regulatory objectives are supported by the statutory functions of the OLSC 
which are set out in section 688 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 
(NSW).149  The OLSC’s Vision and Mission Statement comes closer to the 
draft Legal Profession National Law by providing additional detail about 
what it is that the OLSC is trying to accomplish.150
The situation is similar with respect to the Law Society of NSW and the 
Bar Association.  The Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) sets forth the 
statutory functions of each of these organizations.
 
151  These sections state 
what it is the Law Society Council and the Bar Council can do, but not 
necessarily why they have these powers.  The Act is silent with respect to 
the regulatory objectives of these entities.152  Similar to the OLSC, the why 
question comes closest to being answered in statements that appear on the 
websites of the New South Wales Law Society and the New South Wales 
Bar Association.153
 
 146. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) pt 1.1, s 3 (Austl.). 
  In a similar fashion, the New South Wales Bar 
 147. See supra note 132 (explaining the co-regulatory system). 
 148. In May 1995, Steve Mark, Legal Services Commissioner of New South Wales, 
stated in his inaugural speech that the regulatory objectives of the OLSC are: 
To reduce complaints against the legal profession received and handled by this 
office, by: 
Developing and maintaining appropriate complaints handling processes 
Promoting compliance with high ethical standards 
Encouraging an improved customer focus in the profession 
Developing realistic expectations by the community of the legal system. 
Steve Mark, Complaints Against Lawyers:  What Are They About and How Are They 
Handled?, OFF. LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/
ll_olsc.nsf/pages/OLSC_may_1995 (last updated Feb. 20, 2007). 
 149. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) pt 7.3, s 688 (Austl.) (specifying the statutory 
functions of the OLSC). 
 150. See About Us, supra note 138. 
 151. See Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) pt 7.4, s 696, 699 (Austl.) (identifying the 
statutory functions of the Law Society and its Council, and the Bar Council). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Vision and Mission, LAW SOC’Y NEW S. WALES, 
http://www.lawsociety.com.au/about/ourrole/VisionMission/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 
2012); see also NEW SOUTH WALES B. ASS’N, http://www.nswbar.asn.au/index.php (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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Association’s website identifies its “aims,” thus answering the question of 
what it is trying to accomplish.154
These examples from New South Wales are typical of the “regulatory 
objectives” language in the relevant statutory provisions in the Australian 
states and territories.
 
155
2.  Ireland 
  The use of regulatory objectives in the proposed 
draft National Law will augment the current regulatory framework that 
exists in the states and territories across Australia today.  Those states and 
territories that agree to adopt the draft National Law will thus see regulatory 
objectives being a feature of their legislation for the first time in Australian 
legislative history. 
Ireland is among the jurisdictions that are considering massive reforms to 
the legislation governing the legal profession.  On October 9, 2011, the Irish 
government unveiled its proposed Legal Services Bill.156  Its proposed 
regulatory reforms, including the structure of the proposed new entity called 
the Legal Services Regulation Authority, have been controversial.157
 
 154. See Our Aims, NEW SOUTH WALES B. ASS’N, http://www.nswbar.asn.au/docs/about/
aims.php (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
  A 
recent article attributed the pressure for change to the European Union and 
the International Monetary Fund, which have described Ireland’s legal 
 155. For a list of the regulatory objectives in all of the Australian states, see Yukon 
Discussion Paper, supra note 50, at 109–11.  The format of these acts differs and some of 
these acts refer to “consumers” rather than “clients,” but there is significant overlap among 
the purpose sections of these acts.  Most refer, in one way or another, to client interests, 
public interests, and the administration of justice. See Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) s 6; 
Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) s 3; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 3; Legal Profession 
Act 2007 (Tas) s 3; Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 1.1.1; Legal Profession Act 2008 
(WA) s 11.  The Legal Profession Act of South Australia does not contain a “purpose” or 
“objects” provision. See Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA). 
 156. See Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2011/5811/b5811d.pdf. 
 157. See id. at pt. 2 (setting forth details about the new entity); Niall Tierney, Ireland 
Goes Further than U.K. and Unveils Independent Regulation of Lawyers, LEGAL FUTURES 
BLOG (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/irish-government-goes-
further-than-uk-and-unveils-independent-regulation-of-lawyers (“The Legal Services 
Regulatory Authority, which will have a lay majority, will take over regulation from the Law 
Society and Bar Council of Ireland, who will pay for it through a levy.  The government 
rejected a 2006 recommendation from the Irish Competition Authority that it introduce an 
English-style arrangement, with an oversight regulator and full separation of regulatory and 
representative functions within the Law Society and Bar Council.”); SUBMISSION OF THE BAR 
COUNCIL OF IRELAND TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, DEFENCE AND EQUALITY ON THE 
LEGAL SERVICES REGULATION BILL 2011 ¶¶ 14–15 (Mar. 2012), available at 
http://www.lawlibrary.ie/documents/news_events/BarCouncilSubmissionJointComm
032012.pdf (“The Bar Council has concerns in relation to a number of aspects of the Bill and 
believes that they are not and have not been shown to be in the public interest. . . .  (1) The 
lack of independence of the Legal Regulation Authority from the Minister and the 
Government and the extent of involvement and ministerial over and involvement in the 
powers and functions of the Authority.”); Rule of Law Under Threat:  Legal Independence 
and the Public Interest, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE, Dec. 2011, available at 
http://www.lawsociety.ie/Documents/Gazette/Gazette%202012/January2012_Gazette
Special.pdf (includes the Law Society’s critique of the regulatory structure found in the Draft 
Bill). 
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profession as one of three professional sectors “targeted . . . as ‘sheltered’ 
and in need of reform to make [it] more competitive and cost-effective.”158  
The regulatory objectives are found in section 9(4) of the October 2011 
draft bill.159
The draft bill’s list of objectives is similar in many respects to the list 
found in the United Kingdom and Scotland.  Unlike those jurisdictions, 
however, the proposed Irish regulatory objectives do not include 
“supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law,” improving or 
promoting “access to justice,” or “increasing public understanding of the 
citizen’s legal rights and duties.”
 
160  Instead of these three objectives, the 
Irish bill substitutes “supporting the proper and effective administration of 
justice.”161  The Irish bill also excludes “diverse” or “varied” from the 
description of legal profession characteristics that regulation should 
encourage.162
An explanatory memorandum accompanied the draft bill.
 
163  It did not, 
however, explain how the regulatory objectives were selected or why 
certain objectives found in the U.K. and Scottish bills were included, 
whereas others were not.164
 
 158. See Legal Services Bill for Cabinet Today, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 8, 2011, at 8; id. (“The 
other two professions are medicine and pharmacy.”).  Some commentators have attributed 
the pressure for change to “the Troika,” which includes the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank. See, e.g., Press Release, 
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe [CCBE], European and US lawyers alert IMF 
against Troika-imposed reforms affecting the independence of the profession in ‘bail-out’ 
countries (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/PR_on_
CCBEABA_lette1_1325761475.pdf. 
  Although the draft Irish bill is controversial for 
 159. See Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), § 9(4) (Ir.).  They 
specify: 
(4) The Authority shall, in performing its functions of the regulation of the 
provision of legal services under this Act, have regard to the objectives of— 
(a) protecting and promoting the public interest, 
(b) supporting the proper and effective administration of justice, 
(c) protecting and promoting the interests of consumers relating to the 
provision of legal services, 
(d) promoting competition in the provision of legal services in the State, 
(e) encouraging an independent, strong and effective legal profession, and 
(f) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles 
specified in subsection (5). 
Id. 
 160. Compare id., with Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 § 1(1)(b), (c), (g) (U.K.), and 
Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(a)(i), (c)(i). 
 161. See Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), § 9(4)(b) (Ir.). 
 162. Id.  As discussed below, the failure to include these kinds of specific objectives may 
create confusion over the educative role of the Irish regulators and its purpose. 
 163. See Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), at Explanatory 
Memorandum (Ir.).  The Explanatory Memorandum followed the text of the Draft Legal 
Services Bill. 
 164. The relevant portion of the Explanatory Memorandum simply repeated the contents 
of sections 4 and 5 without providing any explanation or analysis of how or why these were 
selected. See id. at 2. 
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a number of reasons, as of April 2012, the regulatory objectives section did 
not appear to have been a particular focus of discussion or debate.165
3.  India 
 
In India, a draft bill has been introduced that would massively reshape 
regulation of the legal profession.  Legal profession regulation in India is 
handled by the Bar Council of India and the councils in the individual 
Indian states.166  Lawyer regulation has, on occasion, been a divisive topic, 
with the national government pressing for greater liberalization, which the 
Bar Council and many prominent Indian lawyers resist.167
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the federal government has 
introduced a draft practitioner’s act that is very similar to the U.K. Act.  
This draft act includes a section on regulatory objectives for the legal 
profession that lists eight objectives.
  For this reason, 
it is difficult to predict what will happen in India with respect to lawyer 
regulation and the draft bill.   
168
 
 165. See, e.g., Bar Council March 2012 Submission, supra note 
  Although the first three and the last 
regulatory objective are identical to the U.K. regulatory objectives, there are 
four that are different.  For example, the U.K. Act refers to protecting and 
promoting the interests of “consumers,” whereas the draft Indian act refers 
to “protecting and promoting the interests of the clients of the legal 
157, at 5–14 (objecting to 
the proposed regulatory structure and the business structures aspects of the Bill); L. SOC’Y 
GAZETTE, supra note 157; Dearbhail McDonald, Independence of the Legal Profession Is 
Under Threat, IRISH INDEP. (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/
dearbhail-mcdonald-independence-of-the-legal-profession-is-under-threat-2906253.html. 
 166. See About the Council, B. COUNCIL INDIA, http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/about/
about-the-bar-council-of-india/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); see also Jayanth K. Krishnan, 
Globetrotting Law Firms, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 57, 61–62 (2010). 
 167. See generally Krishnan, supra note 166; Kian Ganz, Talking Shop:  England’s Law 
Soc Pres John Wotton on Liberalisation & New BCI Dialogues, LEGALLY INDIA (Sept. 28, 
2011, 5:25 PM), http://www.legallyindia.com/201109282362/Interviews/talking-shop-
englands-law-soc-pres-john-wotton-on-liberalisation-and-new-dialogues-with-bci. 
 168. See [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(d) (India), available at 
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/draft/NALSA.pdf.  This section states: 
(1) In this Act a reference to “the regulatory objectives” is a reference to the 
objectives of— 
(a) protecting and promoting the public interest; 
(b) supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law; 
(c) improving access to justice; 
(d) protecting and promoting the interests of the clients of the legal 
practitioners; 
(e) promoting healthy competition amongst the legal practitioners for 
improving the quality of service; 
(f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession 
with ethical obligations and with a strong sense of duty towards the courts 
and tribunals where they appear; 
(g) creating legal awareness amongst the general public and to make the 
consumers of the legal profession well informed of their legal rights and 
duties; 
(h) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles. 
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practitioners.”169  The U.K. Act refers to “promoting competition in the 
provision of services within subsection (2)” (referring to authorized 
persons), whereas section 3(e) of the Indian draft act adds the word 
“healthy” before competition and adds additional language to explain that 
the goal of the increased competition is to improve the quality of service.170  
The U.K. objective encourages “an independent, strong, diverse and 
effective legal profession,” whereas the Indian draft objective adds “with 
ethical obligations and with a strong sense of duty towards the courts and 
tribunals where they appear.”171  The Indian draft act expands upon the 
U.K. objective that seeks to “increase[e] public understanding of the 
citizen’s legal rights and duties.”  The Indian version of this objective is 
phrased as “creating legal awareness amongst the general public and to 
make the consumers of the legal profession well informed of their legal 
rights and duties.”172
As these examples show, while significant overlap exists among the 
regulatory objectives in the United Kingdom and Scotland on the one hand 
and the draft bill in India on the other hand, there are also significant 
differences.  One of these is the use of the term “client” rather than 
“consumer.”  The use of the term “client” raises an issue that has sparked 
debate in many jurisdictions as to whether persons obtaining legal advice 
should be referred to as “clients” or “consumers.”  From the perspective of 
many in the legal profession, the word “clients” creates a fundamentally 
different conceptual relationship than does “consumers.”
 
173
Regardless of whether India adopts its draft Legal Practitioner’s Act, the 
regulatory objectives section in that act provides food for thought for 
jurisdictions that are considering adopting their own regulatory objectives. 
  Use of the term 
“clients” brings with it a specific relationship that is fiduciary in nature in a 
way that the term “consumers” does not.  In this fiduciary relationship, the 
lawyer generally has a number of professional and ethical obligations such 
as client confidentiality and legal professional privilege.  The term 
“consumers” does not carry the same connotations, and its use could be 
seen to further commoditize the practice of law and undermine the system 
of professional rights and obligations. 
 
 169. Compare Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(d) (U.K.) (using the term 
“consumers”), with [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(d) (India) ( referring “clients”). 
 170.  Compare Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(e) (U.K.), with [Draft] Legal 
Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(e) (India). 
 171. Compare Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(f) (U.K.), with [Draft] Legal 
Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(f) (India). 
 172. Compare Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(g) (U.K.), with [Draft] Legal 
Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(g) (India). 
 173. The authors have personal experience of these kinds of reactions.  The term 
consumer tends to commercialize legal services, because consumers are associated with 
goods and services. 
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C.  Regulatory Objectives in the United States and in Other Jurisdictions 
1.  The United States 
Although some observers might disagree, we submit that the United 
States has not adopted regulatory objectives for the legal profession.  This 
section explains why we believe that neither U.S. state lawyer regulation 
nor the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide the equivalent 
to regulatory objectives.  In general, U.S. lawyers are licensed on a 
statewide basis, rather than at a national level.174  This state-based 
regulation is generally handled by the judicial branch of government, rather 
than by the executive or legislative branch.175  The rationale for judicial 
branch regulation of lawyers is the U.S. constitutional concept of 
“separation of powers.”176  As a result, in most but not all U.S. states, the 
state supreme courts admit and license lawyers, adopt lawyer codes of 
conduct, and discipline lawyers.177
Some U.S. states have what is known as an “integrated” bar to which all 
lawyers licensed in that state must belong.
 
178  These integrated bars 
exercise both regulatory and representational functions.179
 
 174. See, e.g., NAT’L CONF. B. EXAM’RS, http://www.ncbex.org (last visited Apr. 21, 
2012) (includes links to state admission rules).  Although lawyers generally are licensed on a 
state-wide basis, admission to practice before a federal agency, such as the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, is typically set by that agency. See, e.g., Office of Enrollment and 
Discipline (OED), USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 
21, 2012). 
  If a state does 
 175. See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS (Erica Moeser & 
Claire Huismann eds., 2011) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS], 
available at http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/Comp-Guide/CompGuide.pdf; see also 
ABA COMM’N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
(REPORT 201A) (2003) [hereinafter MJP RESOLUTION #1], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/201a.authcheckdam.pdf.  
MJP Resolution #1 stated “that the American Bar Association affirms its support for the 
principle of state judicial regulation of the practice of law.” Id.  California provides an 
exception to this concept and has extensive legislative regulation of lawyers. See, e.g., CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000–6238 (see div. 3, ch. 4 Attorneys); Ethics Information, ST. B. 
CAL., http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/ (includes links to various statutory provisions).  
 176. See, e.g., MJP RESOLUTION #1, supra note 175; see also PENN. CONST. art. V, 
§ 10(c); Mark Scolforo, Lawyer-Lobbyist Rules Expected, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 
25, 2003, at A18.  
 177. See, e.g., ABA CTR. OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, STATUS OF STATE REVIEW OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULES (last updated Sept. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/ethics_2000_status_chart.aut
hcheckdam.pdf. 
 178. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (finding a First Amendment 
violation if California’s bar dues are used for political or ideological lobbying); Resources, 
DIV. FOR BAR SERVS., ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/resources/
state_local_bar_associations.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (contains a map identifying 
unified state bar associations and voluntary state bar associations); see also Unified State 
Bars/The Florida Bar, ST. B. FL., http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/PI/BIPS2001.nsf/
1119bd38ae090a748525676f0053b606/ee84c9f3e29ca3b58525669e004e0cee!OpenDocume
nt (last updated May 26, 2005). 
 179. See, e.g., The State Bar of California Overview, ST. B. CAL., 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/StateBarOverview.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  The 
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not have an “integrated” bar, it will have a voluntary bar association whose 
primary purpose is representational, although this bar may advise the state 
supreme court and others with respect to regulatory issues.180
It is common for U.S. state supreme courts to delegate to separate entities 
the responsibility for administering bar admission rules developed by the 
courts
 
181 and the responsibility for lawyer discipline.182  There are 
substantial differences, however, in terms of where these regulatory entities 
are housed.  States that have an integrated bar sometimes have admissions 
and discipline entities housed within the structure of the state bar.183  States 
with voluntary bar associations tend to have admissions and discipline 
entities that are viewed as agencies of the state supreme court or 
independent entities created by the court.184  We are not aware of any U.S. 
state in which lawyer regulation is handled by a voluntary, representational 
bar association.  Although that previously had been the case in many states 
with respect to discipline issues, there were substantial changes made 
following the 1970 ABA Clark Report, which recommended the 
professionalization of the lawyer disciplinary system.185
It is commonplace in the United States to speak of state judicial 
regulation of lawyers, but that form of regulation is anything but exclusive.  
U.S. lawyers are also subject to state legislative regulation,
 
186 federal 
regulation,187
 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that mandatory lawyer dues may not be used for certain kinds 
of representational actions and that lawyers licensed in these states may request a rebate of 
part of their annual dues. See Keller, 496 U.S. 1. See also Terry, supra note 
 indirect but powerful “regulation” by others entities, 
30, for a 
discussion of the recent heightened antitrust scrutiny of bar associations that exercise both 
representational and regulatory functions.  The division of functions was one of the major 
results of the U.K. Clementi Report and subsequent U.K. Act. See About Us:  History of the 
Reforms, LEGAL SERVS. BOARD, http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/about_us/
history_reforms/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 180. See, e.g., About the Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, PA. 
B. ASS’N, http://www.pabar.org/public/committees/lglethic/about/mission.asp (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2012).  The Pennsylvania Bar Association is not an integrated bar association, but 
its legal ethics committee makes recommendations to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
regarding proposed rule changes. Id.; History of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, PA. B. 
ASS’N, http://www.pabar.org/public/about/history.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 181. See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS, supra note 175. 
 182. See, e.g., ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, 2009 SURVEY ON LAWYER 
DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/cpr/discipline/2009sold.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 183. See, e.g., Public Information, ST. B. GA., http://www.gabar.org/public_information/. 
 184. See For the Public, UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYS. PA., http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Links/
Public/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 185. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, 
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 25–28 (1970); Mary M. 
Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 2008 J. 
PROF. LAW. 359, 369 (noting the changes that followed the Clark Report). 
 186. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 998 
(2009). 
 187. Id. 
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including malpractice insurers,188 and direct and indirect regulation by 
international entities.189
Although the American Bar Association is a voluntary national bar 
association with no binding powers,
 
190 it has been very influential in the 
area of lawyer admissions, conduct rules, and discipline rules.  In each of 
those three areas, the ABA has issued model rules that it recommends the 
state supreme courts adopt.191  The website of the ABA Center for 
Professional Responsibility provides examples of the ABA’s extensive 
efforts to monitor implementation of its policies.192  As this website shows, 
the ABA’s work has been influential in the United States on issues related 
to lawyer regulation.193
To our knowledge, no U.S. jurisdiction has adopted a succinct statement 
of regulatory objectives analogous to section 1 of the U.K. or Scottish Legal 
Profession Acts or the proposed regulatory objectives sections in the 
Australian and Indian Acts.
 
194
 
 188. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 881 
(1992). 
  It is true that the preamble of the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct identifies regulatory concerns, and 
that this preamble has been used as a template by more than forty U.S. 
 189. See Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and Its 
2008 Lawyer Guidance, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 20; Terry, supra note 26, at 193. 
 190. The ABA is not a regulatory entity.  A subset of the ABA, however, might be 
considered to have regulatory powers.  The Council of the ABA Section of Legal Education 
and Admissions to the Bar has been approved by the U.S. Department of Education as the 
national accrediting agency for programs granting J.D. degrees. See generally ABA SECTION 
OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, THE LAW SCHOOL ACCREDITATION PROCESS 3–4 
(2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_
education/2010_aba_accreditation_brochure.authcheckdam.pdf.  Many state supreme courts 
have adopted admission rules that use attendance at an ABA-accredited law school as a 
requirement for first time admission. See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION, supra 
note 175. 
 191. See, e.g., About the Model Rules, CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/lawyer_ethics_
regulation/model_rules_for_lawyer_disciplinary_enforcement.html (last visited Apr. 21, 
2012); DISCIPLINARY BD. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PA., PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF 
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (as of July 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/documents/PARDE-current.pdf; Standing Committee on 
Professional Discipline, CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/di
sciplinecommittee.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 192. See, e.g., Policy & Initiatives, CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy.html (last visited Apr. 
21, 2012). 
 193. Id.; Comparisons Available for Selected Model Rules, CTR. FOR PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
policy/rule_charts.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 194. See generally Charts Comparing Professional Conduct Rules as Adopted by States 
to ABA Model Rules, CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/policy/charts.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). It is 
difficult to prove a negative but these state rule comparisons contain no indication of 
regulatory objectives similar to those found in the U.K. and Australia. 
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jurisdictions.195  Although at least one prominent commentator has 
suggested that the preamble should play a more prominent role in defining 
appropriate lawyer regulation,196 to date that does not seem to have 
happened.  The thirteen-paragraph preamble does not seem to have focused 
attention regarding what are and are not acceptable regulatory objectives.197
The situation is similar with respect to admission rules.  State supreme 
court bar admission rules typically do not include regulatory objectives or a 
purpose statement.
 
198  Many bar admission rules require candidates to have 
graduated from an ABA-accredited law school.199  The preamble of the 
Accreditation Standards adopted by the Council of the ABA Section of 
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar similarly includes “purpose” 
language that might be viewed as akin to regulatory objectives.200
 
 195. See, e.g., ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
COMMITTEE, VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 
PREAMBLE:  A LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES (Oct. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/preamble.authcheckdam.pdf.  
This chart shows how the preamble has been adopted in the rules of professional conduct of 
U.S. states.  It is those state adoptions, rather than the Model Rules, that are the binding 
regulatory provisions.  California and Utah have their own versions of the preamble.  The 
District of Columbia, Louisiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and South 
Dakota declined to adopt the preamble. Id. 
  
However, the recent debate in the United States about whether the ABA 
should accredit law schools located outside the United States demonstrates 
that this preamble is not functioning as “regulatory objectives” in the sense 
of defining what are and are not acceptable objectives for accreditation.  For 
example, some have argued that the ABA should not accredit foreign law 
 196. See Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Citizens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323, 1323 
(2009). 
 197. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2011). 
 198. See, e.g., 204 PA. CODE §§ 101–105 (2012). 
 199. See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS, supra note 175; Pennsylvania Bar 
Admission Rules, PA. B. EXAMINERS, at Rule 203, http://www.pabarexam.org/bar_
admission_rules/203.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 200. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STANDARDS 
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/
2011_2012_standards_and_rules_for_web.authcheckdam.pdf.  The preamble states in part: 
Therefore, an approved law school must provide an opportunity for its students to 
study in a diverse educational environment, and in order to protect the interests of 
the public, law students, and the profession, it must provide an educational 
program that ensures that its graduates: 
(1) understand their ethical responsibilities as representatives of clients, 
officers of the courts, and public citizens responsible for the quality and 
availability of justice; 
(2) receive basic education through a curriculum that develops: 
(i) understanding of the theory, philosophy, role, and ramifications of the 
law and its institutions; 
(ii) skills of legal analysis, reasoning, and problem solving; oral and 
written communication; legal research; and other fundamental skills 
necessary to participate effectively in the legal profession; 
(iii) understanding of the basic principles of public and private law; and 
(3) understand the law as a public profession calling for performance of pro 
bono legal services. 
Id. at pmbl. 
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schools when the job market for graduates of U.S.-based law schools is so 
poor, whereas others have argued that this is not an appropriate basis for 
regulation.201  Neither side seemed to look to the preamble in the Standards 
of Accreditation or in the Rules of Conduct to define the acceptable limits 
of regulation.202
In sum, we consider the United States to be among the jurisdictions that 
have not yet adopted regulatory objectives.  As set forth in more detail in 
Parts III and IV, we recommend that the United States and other 
jurisdictions do so.  We expect that such a project would require time and 
commitment and that there might be vigorous debates about the proper 
contents of any regulatory objectives.  We believe, however, that such 
debate is healthy and that both the process and the results would be 
worthwhile. 
 
2.  Other Jurisdictions 
This Article focuses on eight jurisdictions that have adopted or have 
pending regulatory objectives for the legal profession.  Seven of these 
jurisdictions are primarily English-speaking.203  Six are common law 
jurisdictions.204  We understand that the world of lawyer regulation is much 
broader than is represented by these primarily English-speaking, common 
law jurisdictions205 and have conducted an informal, anecdotal survey of 
other countries in order to determine whether other jurisdictions have 
adopted or have pending regulatory objectives.206
 
 201. See infra note 
  Of the jurisdictions 
230 (citing these debates). 
 202. See infra note 230.  
 203. The seven English-speaking jurisdictions are England and Wales (which are treated 
as a single jurisdiction because their lawyers are regulated together), Scotland, New Zealand, 
Canada, Australia, Ireland, and India.  Although there are many different languages in India, 
its lawyer regulatory provisions are in English. See Professional Standards, BAR COUNCIL OF 
INDIA, available at http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/about/professional-standards/ (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012).  
  The non-English speaking jurisdiction is Denmark.  Although, in our opinion, the 
U.S. has not adopted regulatory objectives for the legal profession, it is included in this 
Article because it was the location of the Fordham colloquium and because the U.S. author 
of this Article urges adoption of a regulatory objectives approach. 
 204. Denmark and Scotland are civil law jurisdictions. See, e.g., Civil Law Systems and 
Mixed Systems with a Civil Law Tradition, JURIGLOBE, UNIV. OF OTTAWA, 
http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/droit-civil.php (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  
We recognize that the Canadian province of Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction, but we have 
counted Canada as primarily a common law jurisdiction. 
 205. The World Trade Organization’s sectoral report on legal services provides a useful 
overview of the many different types of law and lawyer regulation beyond English-speaking 
common law systems. See, e.g., World Trade Organization Council for Trade in Services, 
Legal Services:  Background Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/43 (July 6, 1998), at 2; see also 
2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY:  THE CIVIL LAW WORLD (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 
1988). 
 206. Our efforts include reviewing the links that appear on the APEC Inventory and 
contacting the non-U.S. academics who attended the International Legal Ethics Conference 
IV, which was held in Palo Alto, California in 2010 and members of the IBA International 
Trade in Legal Services Working Group.  We would welcome from readers information on 
regulatory objectives found elsewhere in the world.  
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surveyed, a number had “purpose statements” or “objectives” along the 
lines of the regulatory objectives found in Denmark and some Canadian 
provinces; in many cases, however, the regulatory instruments focused 
much more heavily on what the regulation was doing, rather than why.207
 
 207. A number of countries, including Bulgaria, Finland, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, 
South Africa, Spain, and Sweden, have regulatory provisions that include purpose, 
objectives, or regulatory objectives language that attempts to answer the “why” question for 
lawyer regulation. See, e.g., E-mail from Martin Gramatikov to Laurel S. Terry (Oct 12, 
2011) (noting that Article 2 of Bulgaria’s Bar Act states a general objective that lawyers 
conduct their business in accordance with the legitimate interests of clients, and the specific 
objective that the legal profession is exercised according to the principles of independence, 
exclusivity, self-governance, and self-support.  Article 40 sets forth regulatory objectives for 
individual performance including compliance with the rule of law, client’s interest, and 
ethical behavior) (on file with authors); E-mails from Alexander Muranov to Laurel S. Terry 
(Oct. 13, 2011 and Apr. 7, 2012) (noting that Article 1 of the Federal Law No. 63-FZ of May 
31, 2002 on the practice of law and the bar in the Russian Federation (as amended through 
Nov. 21, 2011) states as its purpose ‘in order to protect [client’s] rights, freedoms, and 
interests and to ensure access to justice.”  Article 3(2) provides that the bar shall function in 
accordance with the principles of legality, independence, self-administration, community, 
and equality among attorneys) (on file with authors); E-mail from Freddy Mnyongani to 
Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 12, 2011) (Sec. 58 of the Attorneys Act of 1979 [South Africa] (as 
amended) sets forth the objects of the society which include twelve very specific items.  
Interestingly, however, none included protection of clients) (on file with authors); E-mail 
from Micaela Thorstrom to Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 19, 2011) (the 2010 Bylaws of the Finnish 
Bar Association set forth three objects of the Bar Association and the bylaws of the Swedish 
Bar Association included four objects.  Neither the Finnish nor the Swedish objects 
identified client protection as one of the objects) (on file with authors); E-mail from Ramon 
Mullerat to Laurel S. Terry (Nov. 6, 2011) (providing translations of Spain’s General Statute 
of the legal profession (Estatuto General de la Abogacia ) which indicate, inter alia, that 
legal profession regulation is to provide a service to society in the public interest); E-mail 
from Mfon Ekong Usoro to Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 17, 2011) (indicating that the Constitution 
of the Nigerian Bar Association, which is recognized by the Legal Practitioner’s Act Cap 
L11, specifies the aims and objects of the Association, including inter alia, improvement of 
the administration of justice); see also E-mail from Dubravka Aksamovic to Laurel S. Terry 
(Oct. 12, 2011) (Croatia’s Attorney Code of Conduct, which includes soft law rules, states 
that in fulfilling their professional obligations and in order to preserve the dignity of, and 
respect for the legal profession, draft legislation always sets forth the regulatory objectives of 
the proposed legislation, even if it is not included within the act itself) (on file with authors); 
Singapore Legal Profession Act (CHAPTER 161) (Original Enactment:  Ordinance 57 of 
1966) REVISED EDITION 2009 (1st June 2009), [8/2011 wef 03/05/2011] at Sec. 38-39;  
E-mail from Martin Henssler to Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 17, 2011) (Germany does not currently 
have separate regulatory objectives but Matthias Kilian has reported on the discussions 
elsewhere) (translation by authors) (on file with authors); E-mails from Arnaldur Hjartarson, 
Law Clerk, the Supreme Court of Iceland to Laurel S. Terry (Oct 12, 2011 and April 6, 
2012) (the Act on Professional Lawyers No. 77/1998 does not have a provision that states 
the regulatory objectives, although objects are sometimes found in the explanatory 
documents with the legislative bill and in the Icelandic Bar Association Statutes) (on file 
with authors); E-mail from Limor Zer-gutman to Laurel S. Terry, (Oct. 12, 2011 (Sections 2 
and 109 of the 1961 Israeli Bar Association Law spell out what it is the bar may do, but in 
the opinion of this Article’s authors, do not explain why) (on file with authors). 
  
None of the surveyed jurisdictions had detailed regulatory objectives of the 
type found in the United Kingdom, Scotland, and in some Canadian 
provinces, or in the pending legislation in Australia, Ireland, and India. 
  As noted earlier, we sought evidence of binding regulatory objectives, rather than 
non-binding “purpose” statements that may appear on webpages or elsewhere. 
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D.  A Synthesis of Existing and Proposed Regulatory Objectives 
As the prior discussion has shown, a number of jurisdictions around the 
world have adopted or proposed regulatory objectives for the legal 
profession.  There is clearly a significant amount of overlap among these 
objectives.  For example, most jurisdictions list client protection as a 
regulatory objective.208  Most jurisdictions also include public protection or 
public interest among their regulatory objectives.209  Many include 
concepts of access to justice,210 public understanding of the legal system,211 
and promoting the rule of law.212
As to other regulatory objectives, however, some jurisdictions consider 
them important enough to explicitly include in their list of regulatory 
objectives, whereas other jurisdictions do not.  For example, some 
jurisdictions have included as an explicit regulatory objective promoting the 
diversity of the legal profession or promoting equal opportunity within the 
legal profession.
 
213  Some jurisdictions consider it important to explicitly 
state that it is their objective to encourage competence214 or compliance 
with the professional principles, whereas other jurisdictions are silent on 
this point.215  Several jurisdictions explicitly refer to the importance to 
independence to the legal profession, but others do not.216  At least two 
jurisdictions—Australia and Ontario—have included general regulatory 
principles among their regulatory objectives.  As noted previously, 
Australia’s Draft Legal Profession National Law includes as a regulatory 
objective promoting regulation of the legal profession that is efficient, 
effective, targeted, and proportionate.217  Australia also includes as a 
regulatory objective an explicit call for consistency.218
 
 208. See infra Appendix 1 (citing Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(d) (U.K.); Legal 
Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(b)(i)). 
  The importance of 
 209. See infra Appendix 1 (citing Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(a) (U.K.); Legal 
Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(b)(ii); Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, 
c. 9, pt. 1, § 3(a) (Can.)). 
 210. See infra Appendix 1 (citing Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(c) (U.K.); Legal 
Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(c)(i)). 
 211. See infra Appendix 1 (citing Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(g) (U.K.)). 
 212. See infra Appendix 1 (citing, inter alia, Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(b) 
(U.K.); Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(a)(i)). 
 213. See infra Appendix 1 (citing Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(f) (U.K.); Legal 
Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(d)). 
 214. See infra Appendix 1 (citing [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, 
s 1.1.3(b) (Austl.)). 
 215. See infra Appendix 1 (citing Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(h) (U.K.); Legal 
Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(f) as examples of jurisdictions explicitly 
citing the principles, as contrasted, for example, with some Canadian provinces). 
 216. See infra Appendix 1 (citing Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(f) (U.K.); Legal 
Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(d)).  For a discussion of the topic of 
independence, see Terry, supra note 30, at 80 (criticizing the EU IHS study and Commission 
reports for their failure to consider adequately the impact of lawyer regulation on the public, 
and the importance of noneconomic arguments, such as the administration of justice and 
rule-of-law issues); Terry, supra note 49, at 14. 
 217. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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consistency among regulators is a topic that is important to a number of 
clients and lawyers.219
It is unclear how much one can or should read into a jurisdiction’s silence 
with respect to a particular objective.  Especially for those jurisdictions that 
adopted their objectives some time ago, they simply may not have 
considered the issue.  As to at least one issue, however, there appears to be 
a clear divergence of views about how to state the objective and where the 
emphasis should be.  This concerns the objective about promoting 
competition for legal services.  In the United Kingdom, for example, the 
objectives states “promoting competition in the provision of services within 
subsection (2)” (referring to authorized persons); whereas in the Draft 
Indian regulatory objectives, it states “promoting healthy competition 
amongst the legal practitioners for improving the quality of service.”
 
220  
Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that a few jurisdictions have regulatory 
objectives that arguably are self-protective and that might lead at least some 
commentators to wonder whether they could withstand challenges from the 
competition authorities that have been very interested in lawyer 
regulation.221
As this brief summary shows, jurisdictions that are considering whether 
to adopt or amend their regulatory objectives for the legal profession have 
many examples to follow and will face many choices.  Part IV of this 
Article provides our recommendations with respect to the concepts we 
recommend and identifies jurisdictions that have adopted similar concepts. 
 
 
 219. See, e.g., ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE—FREEDOM OF 
MOVEMENT FOR ALL LAWYERS ACROSS STATE BOUNDARIES (2010), available at 
http://www.acc.com/advocacy/keyissues/mjp/upload/ACC-Comments-ABA-Ethics-20-20-
WGIFL-7-10.pdf; ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMM. ON PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE:  
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.5 
(DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY AND CHOICE OF LAW) AND 1.10 (IMPUTATION OF CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST) (2010), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071895-
ReportonConflictsofInterestinMulti-JurisdictionalPractice.pdf; ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 
20/20, PROPOSALS OF LAW FIRM GENERAL COUNSEL FOR FUTURE REGULATION OF 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LAW FIRMS AND SOPHISTICATED CLIENTS  31–39 (2011), available 
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20110707_
MJP_Comment_Compilation.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 220. Compare Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(e) (U.K.), with [Draft] Legal 
Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(e) (India). 
 221. New Zealand, for example, includes as one of its regulatory objectives “to recognise 
the status of the legal profession and to establish the new profession of conveyancing 
practitioner.” Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, pt. 1, § 3(1)(c).  Without knowing more 
about the history and context of this regulatory objective, it might raise some eyebrows 
about whether protecting the “status” of the profession is a legitimate objective. See also 
Legal Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8 (Can.).  A number of jurisdictions in Canada list 
as a regulatory objective “upholding the independence, integrity, and honour” of its 
members. See, e.g., British Columbia Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, pt. 1, § 3(a)(ii) 
(Can.); New Brunswick Law Society Act, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89, pt. 2, § 5 (Can.); Prince 
Edward Island Legal Profession Act, S.P.E.I. 1992, c. L-6.1, pt. 2, § 4(c) (Can.); Yukon 
Legal Profession Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 134, pt. 1, § 3(a)(ii) (Can.). 
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III.  GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:  JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE NOT 
ADOPTED REGULATORY OBJECTIVES FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION SHOULD 
DO SO  
The prior sections have shown that there is a global trend toward the 
adoption of regulatory objectives for the legal profession.  This part 
recommends that jurisdictions that have not adopted regulatory objectives 
do so.  We submit that regulatory objectives can create many different kinds 
of beneficial effects.  Some of these beneficial effects may occur before 
specific lawyer regulatory provisions are interpreted or implemented and 
some of the effects may occur after such lawyer regulation is implemented.  
These benefits will inure to a number of different stakeholders, including 
regulators, lawyers, clients, consumers, and the public.  Each of these 
considerations is addressed below. 
A.  The Benefits of Regulatory Objectives 
on Prospective Lawyer Regulation 
We submit that if a jurisdiction has adopted regulatory objectives, those 
stated objectives may have a positive effect on prospective lawyer 
regulation.  As to the regulators themselves, regulatory objectives may aid 
them in their deliberations as to the appropriate bases for regulation.  The 
list of objectives clearly would not provide lawyer regulators with all of the 
answers and would not tell them how to apply those objectives in different 
situations.  They would not, for example, tell regulators when to require and 
when to permit consent to conflicts of interest, whether to permit nonlawyer 
ownership in a law firm, or whether to allow lawyer involvement in 
litigation funding, to name just a few of the difficult issues addressed at this 
colloquium.  Regulatory objectives could, however, make the regulators’ 
jobs somewhat easier by defining what are appropriate factors for them to 
weigh as they consider new regulation. 
Second, the presence of regulatory objectives may prompt regulators to 
“think outside the box” regarding what they are trying to accomplish.  For 
example, during the Fordham colloquium, Professor Alice Woolley 
suggested that it would be useful for lawyer regulators to focus on the root 
causes of lawyer problems and that regulatory objectives might be too 
general to be of much assistance in addressing problems.222  We agree that 
addressing the root cause of lawyer problems is exceedingly important.  In 
our companion article to this Article, we identify some of the current 
regulatory trends in which regulators are trying to do precisely that.223
 
 222. For information on Professor Woolley’s other views, see Deborah L. Rhode & Alice 
Woolley, Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer Regulation:  An Agenda for Reform in the 
United States and Canada, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761 (2012). 
  We 
suggest, however, that regulatory objectives may encourage rather than 
hinder regulators’ efforts to consider these types of issues.  For example, if 
 223. See Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 1.  That article cites trends in lawyer 
regulation.  One of the main focuses of the when trend is to identify root causes of lawyer 
problems by designing ex ante regulation. 
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regulatory objectives are prominently and regularly posted and cited, and 
remind regulators of their obligations to protect clients, that might 
encourage regulators to think about whether there are additional steps they 
could take that would advance this objective.  It is unlikely, in our view, to 
discourage efforts to imaginatively consider what prospective regulation 
might look like. 
Regulatory objectives also have the potential to affect prospective lawyer 
regulation by providing guideposts for what will be—and will not be—
considered appropriate bases for regulation.  It is certainly possible that 
when lawyers debate the regulations to which they will be subject and 
which will affect their livelihoods, they will lack the objectivity that they 
would have if they were not personally affected by the legislation.224  Some 
have argued that this personal stake in regulation is sufficient reason to 
remove regulation from the legal profession.225  Others have argued that 
self-regulation for the legal profession is critical.226
Regulatory objectives also have the potential to affect the views of clients 
and the public toward prospective regulation.  If they have an understanding 
of the interests involved, they may be likely to participate in the debates and 
to understand the differing positions. 
  Regardless of one’s 
views on this point, if a jurisdiction had adopted regulatory objectives for 
the legal profession, those objectives would set the parameters for 
acceptable debate on any particular issue.  Even if lawyers were secretly 
motivated by self-interest, regulatory objectives could help change the 
discourse.  We see this change in discourse as a benefit, even if some 
lawyers remain motivated by self-interest and even if they are able to frame 
their self-interest in regulatory objectives language. 
Two examples illustrate the potential role of regulatory objectives in 
shaping regulator thinking and public discourse about lawyer regulation 
issues.  The first example is Alexander v. Cahill, which is a twenty-first 
century case challenging New York’s lawyer advertising rules.227
 
 224. See, e.g., Decker & Yarrow, supra note 
  In the 
United States, commercial free speech is one area of the law in which 
concepts analogous to regulatory objectives apply.  For example, if a U.S. 
regulator wants to justify advertising rules that limit a lawyer’s commercial 
speech, then under the Supreme Court’s commercial speech test, that 
regulator must show that there is a substantial government interest in 
support of the regulation; that the speech restriction directly and materially 
12, at 36–37 (“Whilst the reason for the 
establishment of self-regulatory bodies in the legal profession may be to address quality 
issues in supply to relatively unknowing customers, there may also be other motivations and 
effects, including the desire to monopolise certain legal activities, to the detriment of 
consumers.”); Rhode & Woolley, supra note 222. 
 225. See, e.g., Rhode & Woolley, supra note 222. 
 226. See, e.g., Gordon Turriff, The Importance of Being Earnestly Independent, 2012 
MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 227. Alexander v. Cahill, 634 F. Supp. 2d 239 (N.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 598 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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advances that interest; and that the regulation is narrowly drawn.228  If a 
regulator fails to use this type of discourse when adopting or justifying the 
rule, it will likely be struck down.  In Alexander v. Cahill, both the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of New York and the Second Circuit 
struck down parts of New York’s advertising rules; the district court in 
particular was critical of the regulators’ failure to identify the substantial 
government interest at stake, or how the regulation directly and materially 
advanced those interests or how it was narrowly drawn.229
The recent ABA debates about accreditation of offshore law schools 
provide the second example of how regulatory objectives might set the 
parameters of public debate by defining the issues the regulator considers 
relevant.  In 2010, the ABA provided notice and sought public comments 
on a proposal that would allow it to apply the existing ABA accreditation 
requirements to a prospective law school, even if that law school was not 
physically located on U.S. soil.
  In other words, 
the Alexander courts expected the parties to shape their debates and 
disagreements according to the “regulatory objectives” framework set forth 
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.  In 
view of this strong reminder, it seems quite likely that in the future, the 
discourse about lawyer advertising will be framed in terms of the Central 
Hudson factors.  Thus, regulatory objectives can play a powerful role in 
shaping regulatory debates. 
230  The issue arose because the Peking 
University School of Transnational Law advised the ABA that it planned to 
seek ABA accreditation and believed that it satisfied all of the ABA’s 
existing criteria, other than the requirement that it be located in the United 
States.231  The ABA received a significant number of comments in response 
to its call for comments.232
 
 228. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). 
  In the view of one of this Article’s authors, a 
number of these comments addressed issues that would have been 
inappropriate for the ABA Council on Legal Education to consider.  If the 
 229. See Alexander, 598 F.3d at 89 (rejecting defendant’s argument that the Central 
Hudson commercial speech test was inapplicable); Alexander, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 256 n.20 
(chastising counsel for failing to analyze the proposed rules under the Central Hudson test, 
the court stated:  “Although the Court finds it commendable that the Appellate Division of 
the State of New York and the disciplinary committees that function on its behalf pursue 
ways to regulate the manner and means by which attorneys who choose to advertise may do 
so, they must be mindful of the protections such advertising has been afforded and take the 
necessary steps to see that the regulation of such advertising is accomplished in a manner 
consistent with established First Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
 230. See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN LAW SCHOOLS SEEKING APPROVAL UNDER ABA 
STANDARDS (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions
/20100719_special_committee_foreign_law_schools_seeking_approval.pdf. 
 231. See, e.g., Dean Jeff Lehman, Remarks at the 2011 Association of American Law 
Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://www.aalsweb.org/am2011/
thursday/hottopicsABA.mp3. 
 232. See Notice and Comment, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/notice_and_comment.
htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (providing links to comments). 
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United States had adopted regulatory objectives for the legal profession, 
those objectives presumably would have set the “ground rules” for the 
debates.  Although there undoubtedly would have continued to be 
disagreements about whether the ABA should accredit foreign law schools, 
and while the motivations of some of the commentators might have been 
the same regardless of the existence of regulatory objectives, the existence 
of those objectives arguably would have shaped the debate in a way that 
would have made it more productive.  Commentators would have had to 
figure out how to frame their arguments in terms of issues that the 
regulators had determined were relevant. 
Some may argue that self-interested lawyers would simply find a way to 
fit their arguments into the regulatory objectives framework and therefore 
the adoption of regulatory objectives would not lead to meaningful 
accomplishments.  Our response is twofold.  First, as noted earlier, we are 
willing to believe that regulatory objectives might positively influence the 
conduct of professional regulators who are not motivated by financial self-
interest.  Second, we believe that even if the secret motivations of certain 
self-interested lawyers do not change, there is a benefit in changing the 
nature of the discourse (and a possibility that the changed discourse might 
lead to changed results). 
B.  The Benefits of Regulatory Objectives After Lawyer Regulation 
Has Been Adopted 
In addition to the impact that regulatory objectives can have in providing 
context and direction for regulation prior to and during implementation, 
regulatory objectives can also have an extremely important role after 
implementation and during regulation.  As is explained in greater detail 
below, regulatory objectives may be useful to regulators who must decide 
how to interpret, implement, and enforce existing lawyer regulations.  
Objectives can also help the legal profession, clients, and the public 
understand the reasons for the regulators’ conduct—or lack of conduct.  
First, because regulatory objectives define the purpose of regulation and set 
its parameters, they will serve as a guide to assist those who are charged 
with interpreting and enforcing the regulations.  For example, assume that 
one regulatory objective is to protect clients and another objective states 
that regulation must be “proportionate.”  These objectives may assist the 
regulator in achieving the ultimate objective of reducing complaints against 
lawyers without the application of oppressive and proscriptive regulatory 
burden.  A regulator might choose to enforce the existing regulation using 
an “education towards compliance” approach that focuses on the ethics and 
professionalism of legal practitioners.233
 
 233. Parker, Gordon, & Mark, supra note 
  This is the approach that has been 
taken by the New South Wales OLSC, and it has resulted in a 33 percent 
40, at 498. 
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reduction in complaints by clients against lawyers who are employed in 
incorporated legal practices.234
Second, regulatory principles can help the regulator in defining the 
parameters of the legislation by assisting in determining its breadth and 
depth.  The regulatory objectives may, for example, create a path for the 
regulator to do more than simply discipline individual legal practitioners for 
breaches.  The ultimate objective of legal profession regulation is, as has 
been mentioned, the higher purpose of reducing complaints against lawyers 
within a framework of consumer protection and protection of the rule of 
law. 
 
Third, regulatory objectives identify, for those affected by the particular 
regulation, the purpose of that regulation and why it is enforced.  The 
inclusion of regulatory objectives may diffuse the oft-stated consumer claim 
that the purpose of lawyer regulation is merely to punish or discipline errant 
legal practitioners, thereby providing no direct benefit to the consumer.  
The experience of the OLSC is that explaining to consumers that the issues 
they raise will be directed at improving the professionalism of the legal 
profession, as well as ultimately reducing complaints against lawyers, goes 
some way toward providing disaffected consumers with an understanding 
that their complaint has had a positive impact. 
Fourth, regulatory objectives assist in ensuring that the function and 
purpose of the particular legislation are transparent.  When the regulatory 
body administering the legislation is questioned, for example, about its 
interpretation of the legislation, the regulatory body can point to the 
regulatory objectives to demonstrate compliance with this function and 
purpose.  This transparency will be useful for clients, the public, and 
lawyers, as well as in the situation in which the regulators responsible for 
implementing and enforcing the regulation are not the same as those who 
drafted the regulation. 
Some might contend that the adoption of regulatory objectives would 
make it more difficult for regulators to discipline practitioners because there 
would be two things they have to prove, rather than just one.  However, in 
the opinion of two of the authors, who are both regulators, regulatory 
objectives could help in achieving their ultimate purpose of reducing 
complaints against lawyers and, particularly where coupled with principle-
based regulation or outcomes-focused regulation, may facilitate disciplinary 
action based on first principles such as “unconscionable conduct” rather 
than relying on specific breaches of proscriptive legislation.  A recent case 
in New South Wales considered the question whether lawyers should 
apportion fees among three clients when three personal injuries actions 
 
 234. See id. at 493.  The drop in complaints does not refer to lawyers as a whole, it only 
refers to a subset of lawyers (those who work in incorporated legal practices).  The OLSC 
has experienced a consistent drop in the number of complaints since the office first opened 
in 1994.  This drop has occurred as the legal profession in New South Wales has continued 
to grow.  Evidence of this is found in the Annual Reports of the OLSC. See Annual Reports, 
OFF. LEGAL SERVS. COMMISSIONER, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/
pages/OLSC_annualreports (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
2732 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
were heard together.235  The lawyer charged each client full fare for each 
day in court (thereby charging three times her normal daily fee), which the 
Legal Services Commissioner considered gross overcharging.236  In the 
decision of the Tribunal, the judge pointed out that while there was no rule 
requiring the apportionment of costs, it would be an unwise lawyer who did 
not do so.237
C.  The Collective Impact of Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession 
  The proposed National Law, which includes regulatory 
objectives as discussed above, will now require proportionality in relation 
to costs which will leave this matter beyond doubt. 
One final point about regulatory objectives is the potential impact of 
widespread adoption of regulatory objectives for the legal profession.  
Regulatory objectives might help the legal profession when it interacts with 
non-traditional regulators.  As one of the authors of this Article has written, 
there are an increasing number of external, non-traditional lawyer 
“regulators,” and this regulation occurs on both a national and an 
international basis, and on the basis of both “hard law” and “soft law.”238  If 
regulatory objectives are adopted by multiple jurisdictions and if they are 
generally consistent, that might help the legal profession in its negotiations 
with these entities.  For example, the legal profession could point to these 
regulatory objectives when trying to convince the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) that there should be extremely limited circumstances in 
which lawyers are required to reveal confidential client information or “tip 
off” governmental entities about their clients.239  Another example is the 
proposed WTO Disciplines on Domestic Regulation.240
[t]he purpose of these disciplines is to facilitate trade in services by 
ensuring that measures relating to licensing requirements and procedures, 
qualification requirements and procedures, and technical standards are 
based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the 
  The current WTO 
Chair’s draft states that  
 
 235. See Bechara v Legal Servs. Comm’r [2010] NSWCA 369 (Austl.). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Terry, supra note 189, at 20. 
 239. See, e.g., FATF Symposium, IBA ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING F., http://www.anti-
moneylaundering.org/2010_FATF_Symposium.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); see also 
Terry, supra note 189, at 1–2; Laurel S. Terry, Transformative Law:  The Impact of 
International Law on Lawyer Regulation:  A Case Study Focusing on the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance (2010), available at 
http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/lst3/presentations%20for%20webpage/Terry_FATF
_AALS_%202010.pdf (presentation slides). 
 240. WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, DISCIPLINES ON DOMESTIC 
REGULATION PURSUANT TO GATS ARTICLE VI:4 (Mar. 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/gats/discipline.doc.  For 
additional discussion of the status of the disciplines discussion, see WORKING PARTY ON 
DOMESTIC REGULATION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC 
REGULATION TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES (2011), S/WPDR/14 (Oct. 24, 2011); 
WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, DISCIPLINES ON DOMESTIC REGULATION 
PURSUANT TO GATS ARTICLE VI:4, CHAIRMAN’S PROGRESS REPORT, S/WPDR/W/45 (Apr. 
14, 2011). 
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ability to supply the service, and do not constitute disguised restrictions 
on trade in services.241
To the extent that multiple jurisdictions identify the same regulatory 
objectives, they are more likely to be accepted by external audiences 
evaluating compliance with any (future) WTO domestic regulation 
disciplines. 
   
We recognize that there are possible negative consequences connected to 
the adoption of regulatory objectives.  It is possible, for example, that if a 
number of jurisdictions adopted regulatory objectives but these objectives 
differed from one another in significant ways, the existence of differing 
objectives would make it more difficult for the legal profession to interact 
with governmental representatives such as the FATF representatives.  
Despite this potential risk, we believe that the benefits of adopting 
regulatory objectives far outweigh the risks, especially since the biggest risk 
seems to be that regulatory objectives will be ineffectual.  We therefore 
recommend that jurisdictions that have not adopted regulatory objectives 
for the legal profession do so. 
IV.  SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS:  CONCEPTS TO INCLUDE 
IN REGULATORY OBJECTIVES FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
Part III recommended that jurisdictions that have not done so develop 
their own set of regulatory objectives for the legal profession to be included 
in the jurisdictionally-appropriate regulatory instrument.242
 
 241. WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, DISCIPLINES ON DOMESTIC 
REGULATION PURSUANT TO GATS ARTICLE VI:4, at 6 (Mar. 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/gats/discipline.authcheckdam.
doc. 
  This part of the 
Article goes further, and addresses the content of such objectives.  We 
recommend that jurisdictions that have not yet adopted regulatory 
objectives for the legal profession (or who have not yet adopted them after a 
rigorous consideration of the issues) use the following list as the template 
for their discussion and debate about the proper regulatory objectives for 
that jurisdiction.  We recognize that there may be as much value in the 
process of adopting regulatory objectives as there is in the result.  Indeed, 
because the history, context, culture, and needs of jurisdictions differ from 
one another, it is possible that modifications to this list may be necessary.  
 242. See generally Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 1 (explaining that different 
jurisdictions use different kinds of instruments for lawyer regulation).  In Australia, for 
example, regulatory objectives might be included in the legal profession acts of each 
Australian state or territory. See Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW); Legal Profession Act 
2004 (Vic); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld); Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA); Legal 
Profession Act 2007 (Tas); Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT); Legal Practitioners Act 1981 
(SA).  In the United States, regulatory objectives might be adopted by a state supreme court 
in a court rule.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to urge the use of one particular form of 
regulatory instrument over another.  The purpose, rather, is to urge that, whatever regulatory 
instrument a jurisdiction uses, that instrument should explicitly include regulatory objectives 
for the legal profession. 
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Despite this possibility, we submit that the following list of concepts will 
provide a useful starting template: 
1. Protection of clients; 
2. Protection of the public interest; 
3. Promoting public understanding of the legal system and respect 
for the rule of law; 
4. Supporting the rule of law and ensuring lawyer independence 
sufficient to allow for a robust rule-of-law culture; 
5. Increasing access to justice (including clients’ willingness and 
ability to access lawyers’ services); 
6. Promoting lawyers’ compliance with professional principles 
(including competent and professional delivery of services); 
7. Ensuring that lawyer regulation is consistent with principles of 
“good regulation.” 
There are several different reasons that this list includes the concept of 
“protection of clients.”  Client protection is almost universally recognized 
as one of the key reasons why lawyer regulation exists.243  Although not all 
current regulatory objectives identify client protection,244
The second concept we recommend is “protection of the public interest.”  
This concept is nearly universally adopted among the jurisdictions we 
examined.
 if one were 
starting from scratch in drafting objectives, it is difficult to imagine that 
there would be any significant debate about whether to include this concept.  
245  Moreover, in those jurisdictions that do not include this 
objective, there is nothing to suggest that it was a deliberate rejection, rather 
than simply an oversight.246  For example, the first draft of the U.K. Act 
omitted public interest from its list of regulatory objectives.247  When the 
omission was pointed out, the Joint Committee of the House of Lords and 
House of Commons quickly added in the “public interest” objective.248  
Protection of the public is often included in the literature that sets forth the 
rationale for lawyer regulation.249
 
 243. See, e.g., Decker & Yarrow, supra note 
  In our view, it is one of the primary 
12, at 41. See generally supra Part I.B and 
accompanying text (citing studies). 
 244. Interestingly, many of the Canadian provinces do not explicitly refer to “client 
protection” in their regulatory objectives. See infra Appendix 2.  We predict, however, that if 
asked, they would not object to the inclusion of this concept. 
 245. See infra Appendix 2; see also infra Appendix 1 (comparing our recommended 
objectives to existing objectives). 
 246. See, e.g., Newfoundland Law Society Act, S.N.L. 1999, c. L-9.1, pt. 1, § 18(1)(1) 
(Can.); Yukon Discussion Paper, supra note 50, at 103 (indicating that although 
Newfoundland does not have a separate regulatory objectives section in its legislation, its 
webpage refers to “public interest”); see also Appendix 2, infra.  The Alberta Legal 
Profession Act similarly omits public interest, but its website refers to public interest. Legal 
Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, available at http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/
Acts/l08.pdf; see also Yukon Discussion Paper, supra note 50, at 107. 
 247. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 249. See generally Decker & Yarrow, supra note 12; Terry, supra note 49 (praising the 
Decker & Yarrow report for its analysis, which included public interest and public protection 
as one of the goals of lawyer regulation but critiquing the study for not explicitly making this 
point throughout the report). 
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justifications for lawyer regulation.  Lawyers’ actions have the potential to 
affect not only the clients they represent, but also society at large.250
We feel that an objective of protecting the public, while beneficial and 
critical as a regulatory objective is not in and of itself enough to achieve the 
broader objective of reducing complaints against lawyers and enhancing the 
standard of the legal profession in the eyes of the public.  This is because a 
“protective jurisdiction” only acts to protect the public from unscrupulous 
lawyers by removing them from practice, limiting their ability to practice, 
or putting conditions on their practice.  Such measures are often based on 
complaints made where the person lodging the complaint gets no benefit 
unless the regulator has additional functions, including dispute resolution 
and/or the power to compensate for damage.  For this reason, our 
recommended objectives also include promoting adherence to principles to 
ensure competence and professionalism.  This objective is described in 
greater detail below. 
 
The third regulatory objective on the list is “promoting public 
understanding of the legal system and respect for the rule of law.”  While 
some but not all jurisdictions include a regulatory objective about 
promoting understanding of the rule of law,251 it seems sensible to do so.  
There seems to be global agreement about the importance of the rule of law 
from both an economic perspective and from an individual rights 
perspective.252  There also seems to be global agreement that lawyers play a 
crucial role in helping the public understand how the legal system works 
and the importance of the legal system to the rule of law.253
The fourth regulatory objective we recommend is promoting the rule of 
law, which includes ensuring lawyer independence sufficient to allow for a 
robust rule-of-law culture.  Although this regulatory objective is related to 
the prior objective, the concepts are distinct.  The prior objective focuses on 
  If the public 
has or develops distrust for the integrity of the system, that may be difficult 
to overcome.  For this reason, we think it is desirable to have an objective 
that recognizes the important role that lawyers can play in facilitating public 
understanding of the legal system and the rule of law. 
 
 250. See, e.g., Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, In re Enron 
Corp., 298 B.R. 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 01-16034), available at 
http://www.enron.com/media/Final_Report_Neal_Batson.pdf. 
 251. See, e.g., Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(b), (g) (U.K.); Legal Services 
(Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(a)(i). 
 252. See, e.g., OECD, PROMOTING PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT:  THE ROLE 
OF ODA 16 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/40/36566902.pdf (noting 
that private investment is tied to a reduction in risk, which can be accomplished “by making 
the implementation of regulations established by national and local governments more 
predictable and enforcement of the rule of law more rigorous”); Eighth United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 
27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, at 118, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990) [hereinafter UN Basic Principles] (setting forth rule-of-law 
principles to which individuals are entitled). 
 253. See, e.g., UN Basic Principles, supra note 252, at 118 (“Whereas adequate 
protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms to which all persons are entitled, 
be they economic, social and cultural, or civil and political, requires that all persons have 
effective access to legal services provided by an independent legal profession . . . .”). 
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the importance of public support in maintaining the rule of law.  This 
objective focuses on the importance of the rule of law itself and the role of 
lawyer independence in ensuring a vibrant rule-of-law culture.254  Although 
jurisdictions may differ on the specific regulatory structures that are needed 
to ensure lawyer independence255 and they may differ as to whether 
particular practices or rules impinge on that independence,256 there appears 
to be near-universal agreement that lawyer independence is an important 
attribute that must be maintained.257
Although a number of jurisdictions have regulatory objectives that use 
the word “independent” or refer to the independence of the lawyer, some of 
them use the word without any language to suggest why it is that 
“independence” is an important value.
 
258  Because calls for lawyer 
independence may be viewed as a cover for “lawyer protectionism,”259 we 
think it is useful for a regulatory objective to explicitly articulate the value 
that lawyer independence serves.  In our view, lawyer independence is 
important because it promotes a rule-of-law culture, which will impact both 
the individual client the lawyer serves as well as the larger society.  We 
believe that this linkage helps explain why, after it was pointed out that the 
first draft of the U.K. Legal Services Act omitted any reference to 
“independence,” the concept was added to the U.K. Legal Services Act.260
The regulatory objectives in some Canadian jurisdictions and the 
proposed objectives in India and Australia come the closest to articulating 
why lawyer independence is important.  For example, the British Columbia 
Legal Profession Act states that it is the duty of the law society “to uphold 
and protect the public interest in the administration of justice 
 
 
 254. See, e.g., id. 
 255. See Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2664–67. 
 256. See, e.g., Yukon Discussion Paper, supra note 50, at 86–88 (expressing concerns 
about publicly traded law firms). 
 257. See UN Basic Principles, supra note 252; see also supra notes 66–68 and 
accompanying text (explaining that when it was pointed out that the first draft of the U.K. 
Legal Services Act omitted the concept of lawyer independence, the Joint Committee of the 
House of Commons and House of Lords agreed without dispute to add this language to the 
next draft of the bill); INT’L B. ASS’N, GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
(2006), available at http://www.int-bar.org/images/downloads/Executive%20office/
Principles%20Legal%20Profession%20A3%20-%20Jan%2008.pdf. 
 258. See, e.g., Law Society Act, S.N.B 1996, c. 89, § 5(c) (Can.) (“It is the object and 
duty of the Society . . . to ensure the independence, integrity and honor of its members.”); 
Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(f) (U.K.) (“encouraging an independent, strong, 
diverse and effective legal profession”); Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 
58/2011), § 9(4)(e) (Ir.) (“encouraging an independent, strong and effective legal 
profession”); Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(d) (“promoting an 
independent, strong, varied and effective legal profession”); Bylaws of the Danish Bar and 
Law Society, supra note 123, at bylaw 1 (referring to the duty “to guard the independence 
and integrity of lawyers”). 
 259. See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services:  On 
the First Amendment Rights of Corporations and Individuals, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1800258 
(occasionally treating as interchangeable independence, reputation protection, and 
professionalism arguments). 
 260. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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by . . . ensuring the independence, integrity and honour of its members.”261  
One of India’s proposed regulatory objectives encourages “an independent, 
strong, diverse and effective legal profession with ethical obligations and 
with a strong sense of duty towards the courts and tribunals where they 
appear.”262  The Australian objective is to provide a “co-regulatory 
framework within which an appropriate level of independence of the legal 
profession from the executive arm of government is maintained.”263  We 
believe that the rule-of-law concept includes within it the obligations to the 
tribunal found in India’s draft language.  Unlike the Australian objective, 
however, we do not believe that all jurisdictions currently are in a position 
to recommend a co-regulatory structure of government.264
The fifth regulatory objective we recommend is increasing access to 
justice (including clients’ ability to access and pay for legal services).  A 
number of jurisdictions have included “access to justice” among their 
regulatory objectives.
  Nevertheless, 
we believe that whatever regulatory instrument(s) and regulatory structures 
a jurisdiction uses, they should be designed so as to maintain the 
independence of the legal profession.  Moreover, we believe that it is 
important for the legal profession to be independent, not only with respect 
to the executive branch of government, but also with respect to the 
legislative branch of government. 
265
It is perhaps worth noting at this point that our list of recommended 
regulatory objectives concepts does not include the words “competition in 
legal services,” even though a number of jurisdictions have included 
“competition” among their regulatory objectives.
  We suspect that the jurisdictions that have not 
included this objective would not object to it, but simply did not think to 
include it.  Research has not revealed any instances in which proponents 
suggested adding this objective, but were defeated.   
266
 
 261. Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, § 3(a)(ii) (Can.).  While we think 
independence should be included in regulatory objectives for the legal profession, we do not 
believe that honor or dignity are comparable values.  While “integrity” is obviously 
important, given the other objectives, we do not think it is necessary to include a reference to 
lawyer integrity among the regulatory objectives. Cf. id. 
  This is because we 
concluded that competition is not a value in and of itself, but is an 
instrumental value—designed to achieve something else.  Upon reflection 
 262. [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(d) (India). 
 263. [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(f) (Austl.). 
 264. See generally Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 1. 
 265. See, e.g., Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(c)(i) (“Promoting . . . 
access to justice.”); Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(c) (U.K.) (“improving access to 
justice”).  It is not yet clear whether the difference between “promoting” and “improving” 
access will prove significant. 
 266. See, e.g., [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(e) (India) (“promoting healthy 
competition amongst the legal practitioners for improving the quality of service”); Legal 
Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), § 9(4)(d) (Ir.) (“promoting competition in 
the provision of legal services in the State”); Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 
16), § 1(c)(ii) (“promoting . . . competition in the provision of legal services”); Legal 
Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(e) (U.K.) (“promoting competition in the provision of 
services within subsection (2) [referring to authorized persons]”).  
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and consideration of the many antitrust studies of the legal profession,267 
we believe that increased competition is desirable because of the effect it 
will have on access to justice issues.  In our view, access to justice includes 
concepts related to the price of legal services, availability and accessibility 
of legal services, as well as quality.  This concept is part of what underlies 
the proposed Australian objective that emphasizes “empowering clients of 
law practices to make informed choices about the services they access and 
the costs involved”268 and India’s proposed objective of “promoting healthy 
competition amongst the legal practitioners for improving the quality of 
service.”269
The sixth regulatory objective concept listed is promoting lawyers’ 
compliance with professional principles, including competent and 
professional delivery of legal services.  A number of jurisdictions have 
regulatory objectives that refer to professional principles in one fashion or 
another.
  We believe that the best articulation of this concept of 
competition is a regulatory objective that refers to access to justice and 
makes clear that access includes issues of availability, access, price, and 
quality.  We recognize, however, that this choice may be controversial and 
that some may view legal profession regulation as self-interested and may 
want the concept of competition to be explicitly included. 
270  While one might argue that such a regulatory objective is 
unnecessary given the existence of the professional principles, we think that 
it is essential to include a reference to the professional principles (including 
conduct rules and the like) as a reminder of their central place in lawyer 
regulation and as a secondary means of promoting the rule of law.  We have 
expanded upon the existing objectives by explicitly including the goals of 
competent and professional delivery of legal services.  Competence is 
obviously necessary, but it is so fundamental that it sometimes goes 
unnoticed.271
 
 267. See supra notes 
  We believe it is important to make this objective explicit.  
28–37 and accompanying text (discussing various antitrust studies 
of the legal profession). 
 268. See [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3 (Austl.). 
 269. Id. ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(d) (Austl.); [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(e) (India). 
 270. See, e.g., Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 § 1(1)(h) (U.K.) (“promoting and 
maintaining adherence to the professional principles”); [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, 
§ 3(h) (India) (same); Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), § 9(4)(f) (Ir.) 
(same); Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(f).  Australia does not refer to 
the concept of professional principles but identifies the principles of competency and high 
ethical and professional standards. See [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, 
pt 1, s 1.1.3(b) (Austl.) (“ensuring lawyers are competent and maintain high ethical and 
professional standards in the provision of legal services”).  Many Canadian provinces refer 
to professional responsibility. See infra Appendix 2. 
 271. See, e.g., Report to the House of Delegates – Recommendation – Center for 
Professional Responsibility, ABA, ¶ 1, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdprecommendation.html (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2012) (listing core values but omitting competence); Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice, Updated Background and Informational Report and Request for 
Comments, ABA, pt. II ¶ 1, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
commission_multidisciplinary_practice/febmdp.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) 
(recommending the addition of competence as a core value); see also Laurel S. Terry, A 
Primer on MDPs:  Should the “No” Rule Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 903–
04 n.158, 910 n.195 (1999). 
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We also added language to this objective specifying that legal services must 
be delivered professionally.  While we recognize that in some jurisdictions, 
the concept of professionalism arguably has been used as a cover for lawyer 
self-protection,272 we think that when interpreted and implemented 
properly, the concept is valuable.  For example, the New South Wales 
OLSC has taken the position that in addition to promoting the other 
objectives, its role includes enhancing the professionalism of legal 
practitioners and reminding them of what it means to be part of a 
profession.273
The seventh and final regulatory objective on our list is ensuring that 
lawyer regulation is consistent with principles of “good regulation.”  As 
noted earlier, only a few jurisdictions have included general principles 
within their regulatory objectives.
  We ultimately concluded that it is vital that regulatory 
objectives promote professionalism both to meet the primary purpose of 
regulation as well as to address concerns raised in some quarters that 
regulation could have the effect of suppressing professionalism. 
274  There are several reasons why our 
recommendations include this objective.  We believe that it is 
uncontroversial that lawyer regulators should comply with good regulation 
principles.  Accordingly, we see a benefit to including that concept within 
the regulatory objectives so as to provide notice, transparency, and a 
reminder of these expectations.  Second, if the regulatory objectives do not 
include these types of general principles, it is perhaps more likely that these 
principles will be imposed on lawyer regulators in ways that they find less 
satisfactory.275
 
 272. See, e.g., Knake, supra note 
  Third, we believe that for regulation to be effective, it must 
include a constant questioning or assessment of the effectiveness of the 
regulation in terms of those that are regulated (lawyers) and those affected 
by the regulation (clients, consumers, and the general community).  
Regulatory objectives can have the effect of making this clear to the 
regulators so as to enhance their role in promoting professionalism, the rule 
of law, and client protection. 
259; Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional 
Monopoly:  A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 40 (1981); Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of 
Professionalism:  The ABA’s Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 
363, 368–69 (1993); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics:  The Making of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 725 (1989). 
 273. See Mark, supra note 39. 
 274. See supra notes 101–05, 128 and accompanying text (describing the general 
regulation principles found in Australia and in the regulated professionals’ acts in Manitoba, 
Ontario, and Nova Scotia). 
 275. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 26, at 209 (“When these new regulators approach the 
topic of lawyer regulation, they are much more likely to assume that lawyers should be 
treated in a manner similar to other service providers.  Moreover, such regulators are likely 
to be skeptical of claims that the legal profession is unique and should be treated differently 
than other professions.”); Terry, supra note 189, at 1 (explaining how the legal profession 
came into the game late with respect to implementation of the FATF recommendations); E-
mail from Darrel Pink, supra note 105 (noting that there was “a fair amount of controversy” 
concerning legislation in Nova Scotia and elsewhere because “it introduced a new level of 
government oversight over all professions”). 
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If jurisdictions decide to include a reference to good regulation principles 
within their regulatory objectives, one of the decisions they will face is 
whether to spell out the principles of good regulation or simply refer to the 
concept in general.  The Australian and Canadian examples have cited 
specific principles of good regulation.  The advantage of doing that is that 
the expectations are clear.  The disadvantages include the fact that what is 
considered good regulation is expressed somewhat differently in different 
jurisdictions and may evolve over time.276
A second possible disadvantage of including specific “good regulation” 
principles is that by specifying the issues, the legal profession may bring to 
the forefront an issue that to date has remained on the back burner.  In 
particular, some governments and commentators have used language that 
could be interpreted to mean that before legal regulators act, they must have 
empirical evidence justifying the proposed rule or restriction.
 
277
While this type of “empiricism” principle undoubtedly makes sense in 
some contexts (such as prescription drug approvals), is it an appropriate 
principle to use for legal profession regulation where it may be difficult to 
measure ex ante the impact of regulatory changes on objectives such as 
public interest or the rule of law?  If this “empiricism” principle is not an 
appropriate one to include in regulatory objectives, is that a reason to 
exclude general regulatory principles such as those found in the draft 
Australian regulatory objectives?  Despite these possible disadvantages, we 
conclude that jurisdictions should include a reference to good regulatory 
principles, if not a list of those general regulatory principles. 
 
Appendix 1 is a chart that compares the objectives we recommend to the 
objectives that have been drafted for, or enacted by, other jurisdictions.  
Appendix 2 demonstrates that the seven regulatory objective concepts that 
we recommend are consistent with regulatory objectives found around the 
world. 
Although Appendix 1 demonstrates that there is precedent for all of the 
concepts we recommend, we have not recommended adoption of all of the 
concepts currently found in various regulatory objectives.  To the contrary, 
 
 276. The draft Australian regulatory objectives for the legal profession state that 
regulation should be efficient, effective, targeted, and proportionate. See [Draft] Legal 
Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(e).  Other jurisdictions have endorsed 
“good regulation” concepts that are similar in principle to these Australian objectives, but 
that are phrased differently. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  The APEC-OECD 
Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform asks whether regulation (broadly defined) is 
transparent, consistent, comprehensible, accessible to users both inside and outside 
government, and to domestic as well as foreign parties and whether its effectiveness is 
regularly assessed. See APEC-OECD Checklist, supra note 9, at 7. 
 277. See, e.g., OECD, OECD GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR REGULATORY QUALITY AND 
PERFORMANCE (2005) (“Good regulation should:  (i) serve clearly identified policy goals, 
and be effective in achieving those goals; (ii) have a sound legal and empirical basis . . . .” 
and listing six other items);  CANADIAN COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 2, at 37–41  
(“Restrictions should be directly linked to clear and verifiable outcomes.”); APEC-OECD 
Checklist, supra note 9, at 12 (“Are the legal basis and the economic and social impacts of 
drafts of new regulations reviewed?  What performance measurements are being envisaged 
for reviewing the economic and social impacts of new regulations?”). 
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we deliberately considered and then rejected a number of concepts found in 
other jurisdictions.  One of the first concepts we rejected was the idea of 
setting priorities among the regulatory objectives.  Although some 
jurisdictions—notably India—have tried to do this, most jurisdictions have 
chosen not to set priorities, even though the objectives may appear to 
compete on occasion.  We consider the latter approach to be the wisest.  We 
believe that it will be difficult to predict at the outset which objective 
should be given priority in any given set of facts.  Although one might 
argue that the objectives provide little guidance, as noted earlier, we believe 
that it is a very useful step forward if the objectives can be used to frame the 
conversation and debate so that one knows what are acceptable grounds for 
regulation. 
Second, we considered but deliberately omitted any regulatory objective 
that focused on the interests of the legal profession or that referred to 
maintaining the monopoly of the legal profession, even if it made those 
interests subordinate to the objectives described above.  Different 
jurisdictions have framed this type of objective in different ways.278  
Regardless of how it is couched, however, we believe that it is unwise to 
include this type of objective within the list.  While we recognize that it 
might be possible to make a principled argument in favor of such an 
objective, we concluded that the risks were too great that such an objective 
would lead to rent-seeking behavior or self-dealing on the part of the 
profession or to concerns about such behavior.279
As noted earlier, we omitted the objective of “promoting competition,” 
which is found in several jurisdictions, because we concluded that it was 
best viewed as an instrumental value rather than as an end in itself.  For 
similar reasons, we omitted the regulatory objective that encouraged an 
independent, strong, diverse, professional, and effective legal profession.
 
280
 
 278. See, e.g., Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, pt. 1, § 3(1)(c) (N.Z.) (citing the 
purpose “to recognise the status of the legal profession”); Bylaws of the Danish Bar and Law 
Society, supra note 
  
We concluded that, in the context of developing objectives for lawyer 
regulation, this objective, similar to the competition objective, was best 
viewed as instrumental value rather than as an end in itself.  One reason 
why we value a diverse legal profession is to ensure greater access to justice 
123, at bylaw 1 (stating the purpose “to work for the benefits of the 
Danish legal community”); Legal Professions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, pt. 3, § 49(1)(b) 
(Can.) (“tends to harm the standing of the legal profession generally”); Legal Profession Act, 
S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, § 3(b)(ii) (Can.) (“Subject to paragraph (a) . . . to uphold and protect the 
interests of its members.”); Legal Profession Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1998, c. L-2, § 22(a) (Can.) 
(“[prohibited conduct] is such as to be harmful to . . . the members of the Society.”). 
 279. See, e.g., Decker & Yarrow, supra note 12, at 61 (“We have explained why self-
regulatory bodies have a natural incentive to promulgate rules that serve to improve their 
own positions, at the expense of consumers, particularly when such a shift in resources can 
be achieved with limited adverse effects on economic efficiency (the envelope theorem).  
This means that even self-regulatory objectives that are heavily weighted towards promotion 
of the general good, and only very modestly weighted towards professional self interest, 
could have significantly adverse implications for consumers.”); Rhode & Woolley, supra 
note 222. 
 280. Cf. Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(d). 
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for clients and citizens.  We value an independent and strong legal 
profession so that lawyers can take their proper place in preserving the rule 
of law in a society.  We also thought that there were better locations to 
address the objective of ensuring equal access to the profession.281
As a final observation, we recognize that even if a jurisdiction accepts 
our recommendation to include a particular concept in its regulatory 
objectives, the jurisdiction will have choices with respect to how it 
expresses that regulatory objective concept.  Although we originally 
considered recommending specific language, we ultimately chose not to do 
so and to limit our recommendations to concepts rather than specific 
language. 
 
Our decision not to recommend specific language, however, does not 
mean that we consider the language used in the objectives to be 
unimportant.  To the contrary, as this Article has shown, many of the 
debates that have taken place in jurisdictions have been about relatively 
subtle language differences that affect the emphasis and tone.  One 
jurisdiction may decide, for example, that given its history, context, 
problems, and goals, it is very important to refer to legal services 
“consumers” whereas another jurisdiction may decide just the opposite and 
that it is very important to refer to “clients.”  We conclude that given the 
differing contexts in different jurisdictions, it is inappropriate to 
recommend a “one size fits all” approach with respect to specific 
language.282
CONCLUSION 
  We do believe, however, that it is possible to recommend 
concepts that will serve as a useful template for all jurisdictions. 
A number of jurisdictions have adopted regulatory objectives for the 
legal profession, and interest in this issue is growing:  regulatory objectives 
have been proposed for Australia, Ireland, and India, among other countries.  
We submit that there is a very good reason for the increased interest in 
adopting regulatory objectives.  Put simply, regulatory objectives make for 
better lawyer regulation both in theory and in practice.  Because regulatory 
objectives define the purpose of regulation and set its parameters, they serve 
as a guide to assist those regulating the legal profession.  Regulatory 
objectives identify, for those affected by the particular regulation, the 
purpose of that regulation.  Regulatory objectives can help set the 
parameters of public debate by defining the issues the regulator considers 
relevant.  Regulatory objectives assist in ensuring that the function and 
purpose of the particular legislation is transparent.  For example, when the 
regulatory body administering the legislation is questioned, about their 
interpretation of the legislation, the regulatory body can point to the 
regulatory objectives to demonstrate compliance with this function and 
purpose.  Regulatory objectives can help define the parameters of the 
 
 281. Id. § 1(e) (encouraging equal opportunities). 
 282. If asked, however, we are happy to make specific recommendations for our own 
jurisdictions. 
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legislation by assisting in determining the breadth and depth of legislation.  
Finally, if regulatory objectives are adopted by multiple jurisdictions and if 
they are generally consistent, that might help the legal profession in its 
negotiations with these jurisdictions. 
For these reasons, we urge the jurisdictions that have not yet adopted 
regulatory objectives for the legal profession to do so promptly.   
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APPENDIX 1 
COMPARING OUR RECOMMENDED OBJECTIVES WITH EXISTING AND DRAFT 
REGULATORY OBJECTIVES283
 
 
Our 
Recommended 
Objective 
Related Concepts in 
Draft or Existing 
Objectives 
Variations and Observations 
1.  Protection 
of clients 
 U.K. § 1(1)(d)284
 Scotland § 1(b)(i)
 
285
 New Zealand 
§ 3(1)(a)–(b)
 
286
 Nova Scotia § 33
 
287
 Draft Australia 
s 1.1.3(c)
 
288
 Draft India § 3(d)
 
289
 Draft Ireland 
§ 9(4)(c)
 
290
Some objectives refer to 
“consumers” and some refer 
to “clients.”
 
291
Some include in a single 
objective “protecting” and 
“promoting” the interests of 
consumers.
 
292
Some do not refer 
explicitly to clients but 
presumably include this idea 
when referring to public 
interest.
  We have 
separated these in 
Recommended Objectives 1 
and 5. 
293
 
 283. Our recommended objectives and rationale are set forth supra.  The existing and 
draft regulatory objectives for the legal profession are described supra at Part II.A–B.  For 
convenience’s sake, the existing and draft regulatory objectives are consolidated in 
Appendix 2, infra.  This appendix cross-references our recommended objectives with the 
existing and draft regulatory objectives for the legal profession.  Appendix 1 also highlights 
some of the comments found in Part II.D. 
 
 284. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(d) (U.K.). 
 285. Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(b)(i). 
 286. Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, pt. 1, § 3(1)(a)–(b) (N.Z.). 
 287. Legal Profession Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 28, pt. 3, § 33 (Can.). 
 288. [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(c) (Austl.). 
 289. [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(a) (India). 
 290. Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), pt. 2, § 9(4)(c) (Ir.). 
 291. Compare Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(d) (U.K.) (consumers), with [Draft] 
Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(d) (India) (clients). 
 292. See, e.g., Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(d) (U.K.) (“protecting and 
promoting the interests of consumers”). Compare Recommended Objective 1 (protection of 
clients), with Recommended Objective 5 (increasing access to justice). 
 293. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, pt. 1, § 3(a) (Can.). 
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Our 
Recommended 
Objective 
Related Concepts in 
Draft or Existing 
Objectives 
Variations and Observations 
2.  Protection 
of the public 
interest 
 U.K. § 1(1)(a)294
 Scotland § 1(b)(ii)
 
295
 New Zealand 
§ 3(1)(b)
 
296
 Alberta § 49(c)
 
297
 British Columbia 
§ 3(a)
 
298
 Manitoba § (3)(1)
 
299
 New Brunswick 
§ 5(a)
 
300
 Newfoundland and 
Labrador 
§ 18(1)(1)
 
301
 Northwest Territories 
§ 22(a)
 
302
 Nova Scotia § 33
 
303
 Ontario § 4.2(3)
 
304
 Prince Edward Island 
§ 4(a)
 
305
 Quebec § 12
 
306
 Saskatchewan 
§ 3.1(a)
 
307
 Yukon § 3(a)
 
308
 Draft Australia 
s 1.1.3(c)
 
309
 Draft India § 3(a)
 
310
 Draft Ireland 
§ 9(4)(a)
 
311
Most cite protection of 
the public interest, but 
Australia simply cites 
protection of the public.
 
312  
Some refer to the “best 
interests” of the public and 
some add the word 
“generally” after stating 
protection of the public 
interest.313
Some say protecting and 
promoting, others do not.
 
314  
Scotland has distinct 
objectives for supporting the 
interests of justice and 
protecting-promoting public 
interest.315
This key concept was 
omitted from the original 
U.K. bill.
 
316
 
 294. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(a) (U.K.). 
 
 295. Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(b)(ii). 
 296. Cf. Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, pt. 1, § 3(1)(b) (N.Z.).  This section refers 
to maintaining confidence in the provision of legal services, which might mean something 
different than protection of the public interest. 
 297. Legal Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, pt. 3, § 49(c) (Can.). 
 298. Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, pt. 1, § 3(a) (Can.). 
 299. Legal Profession Act, C.C.S.M., c. L107, pt. 2, § (3)(1) (Can.). 
 300. Law Society Act, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89, pt. 2, § 5(a) (Can.). 
 301. Law Society Act, S.N.L. 1999, c. L-9.1, pt. 1, § 18(1)(1) (Can.). 
 302. Legal Profession Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1998, c. L-2, pt. 3, § 22(a) (Can.). 
 303. Legal Profession Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 28, pt. 3, § 33 (Can.). 
 304. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, pt. 1, § 4.2(3) (Can.). 
 305. Legal Profession Act, S.P.E.I. 1992, c. L-6.1, pt. 2, § 4(a)(Can.). 
 306. An Act Respecting the Barreau du Québec, R.S.Q., c. B-1, § 12 (Can.). 
 307. Legal Profession Act, 1990, S.S. 1990, c. L-10.1, pt. 2, § 3.1(a) (Can.). 
 308. Legal Profession Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 134, pt. 1, § 3(a) (Can.). 
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3.  Promoting 
public 
understanding 
of the legal 
system and 
respect for the 
rule of law 
 U.K. § 1(1)(b)317
 Scotland § 1(a)(i)
 
318
 Ontario § 4.2(1)
 
319
 Draft India 
§ 3(b), (g)
 
320
 Draft Ireland 
§ 9(4)(b)
 
321
U.K. § 1(1)(b) and others 
refer to supporting the 
“constitutional” principle of 
the rule of law and § 1(1)(g) 
asks for increased public 
understanding of citizens’ 
rights and duties. 322  India 
§ 3(g) similarly focuses on 
public knowledge.323  
Ireland refers to supporting 
the proper and effective 
administration of justice.324
 
 309. [Draft] Legal Professional National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(c) (Austl.). 
 
 310. [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(a) (India). 
 311. Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), pt. 2, § 9(4)(a) (Ir.). 
 312. Compare Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(a) (U.K.), with [Draft] Legal 
Professional National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(c) (Austl.). 
 313. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, pt. 3, § 49(c) (Can.) (“is 
incompatible with the best interests of the public”); Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, 
(A.S.P. 16), § 1(b)(ii) (“the public interest generally”). 
 314. Compare Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(a) (U.K.) (“protecting and 
promoting”), with Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, pt. 1, § 4.2(1) (Can.) (“The Society 
has a duty to protect the public interest.”). 
 315. See Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(a)(ii), (b)(ii). 
 316. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 317. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(b), (g) (U.K.). 
 318. Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(a)(i). 
 319. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, pt. 1, § 4.2(1) (Can.) (“The Society has a duty 
to maintain and advance the cause of justice and the rule of law.”).  British Columbia, New 
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and the Yukon refer to the public interest in the 
administration of justice, which is arguably similar. See Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, 
c. 9, pt. 1, § 3(a) (Can.); Law Society Act, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89, pt. 2, § 5(a) (Can.); Legal 
Profession Act, S.P.E.I. 1992, c. L-6.1, pt. 2, § 4(a) (Can.); Legal Profession Act, R.S.Y. 
2002, c. 134, pt. 1, § 3(a) (Can.). 
 320. [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(b), (g) (India). 
 321. Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), pt. 2, § 9(4)(b) (Ir.). 
 322. See Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(b), (g) (U.K.) (“increasing public 
understanding of the citizen’s legal rights and duties”). 
 323. [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(b), (g) (India) (“creating legal awareness 
amongst the general public and to make the consumers of the legal profession well informed 
of their legal rights and duties”). 
 324. Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), pt. 2, § 9(4)(b) (Ir.). 
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Objective 
Related Concepts in 
Draft or Existing 
Objectives 
Variations and Observations 
4.  Ensuring 
lawyer 
independence 
sufficient to 
allow for a 
robust “rule of 
law” culture 
 U.K. § 1(1)(b)325
 Scotland 
§ 1(a)(i), 1(d)
 
326
 Denmark Bylaw 1
 
327
 British Columbia 
§ 3(a)(ii)
 
328
 Manitoba § 3(1)
 
329
 New Brunswick 
§ 5(c)
 
330
 Prince Edward Island 
§ 4(c)
 
331
 Yukon § 3(a)(2)
 
332
 Draft Australia 
1.1.3(f)
 
333
 Draft India § 3(f)
 
334
 Draft Ireland 
§ 9(4)(e)
 
335
The concept of lawyer 
independence appears often 
but in varied settings.  
Several jurisdictions refer to 
lawyer independence; some 
of these same jurisdictions 
have separate objectives 
regarding the rule of law.
 
336
Regarding independence, 
the United Kingdom says 
“ensuring an independent, 
strong, diverse, and effective 
legal profession.”
 
337  Others 
refer to “varied” rather than 
“diverse” and some omit 
this term.338  India adds 
language that lawyers have 
ethical obligations and a 
strong sense of duty toward 
tribunals.339
Many Canadian provinces 
refer in the same paragraph 
to “independence, integrity, 
and honor.”
 
340
The Australian objective 
combines independence 
with a reference to co-
regulatory systems.
 
341
Our recommendation 
combines these concepts so 
that it is clear that lawyer 
independence is not a self-
serving value, but is directly 
related to maintaining a 
robust rule of law. 
 
 
 325. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(b), (e) (U.K.). 
 326. Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(a)(i), 1(d). 
 327. Bylaws of the Danish Bar and Law Society, supra note 123, at bylaw 1 (“to guard 
the independence and integrity of lawyers”). 
 328. Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, pt. 1, § 3(a)(iii) (Can.). 
 329. Legal Profession Act, C.C.S.M., c. L107, pt. 2, § 3(1) (Can.). 
 330. Law Society Act, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89, pt. 2, § 5(c) (Can.). 
 331. Legal Profession Act, S.P.E.I. 1992, c. L-6.1, pt. 2, § 4(c) (Can.). 
 332. Legal Profession Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 134, pt. 1, § 3(a)(2) (Can.). 
 333. [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(f) (Austl.). 
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5.  Increasing 
access to 
justice 
(including 
clients’ 
willingness and 
ability to 
access lawyers’ 
services) 
Access to justice 
provisions: 
 
 U.K. § 1(1)(c)342
 Scotland § 1(c)(i)
 
343
 Ontario § 4.2(2)
 
344
 Draft Australia 
s 1.1.3(e)
 
345
 Draft India § 3(c)
 
346
 
 
Competition provisions: 
 
 U.K. § 1(1)(e)347
 Scotland § 1(c)(ii)
 
348
 Draft India § 3(e)
 
349
 Draft Ireland 
§ 9(4)(d)
 
350
There is some language 
variability.  The United 
Kingdom says “improving 
public access” whereas 
Scotland says “promoting 
public access.”
 
351  Australia 
speaks of empowering 
clients to make informed 
choices about the services 
and costs.352
We believe that 
“competition” is best 
thought of as an 
instrumental goal designed 
to increase access rather 
than as a stand-alone 
objective.  We have added 
language to explain that 
access includes concepts of 
ability and willingness, 
which would include cost 
and other issues.  There is 
some variability among 
those jurisdictions that list 
competition as a stand-alone 
objective.  India, for 
example, states that 
competition must be for the 
goal of improving the 
quality of service. 
 
 
 334. [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(f) (India). 
 335. Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), pt. 2, § 9(4)(e) (Ir.). 
 336. See, e.g., Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(a)(i), 1(d); see also 
Recommended Objective 3, supra, for citations to objectives with “rule of law” language. 
 337. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(b), (e) (U.K.). 
 338. See, e.g., Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(d) (“promoting an 
independent, strong, varied and effective legal profession”). 
 339. [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, ch. 3(f) (India). 
 340. See, e.g., Law Society Act, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89, pt. 2, § 5(c) (Can.); Legal Profession 
Act, S.P.E.I. 1992, c. L-6.1, pt. 2, § 4(c) (Can.). 
 341. [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(f) (Austl.). 
 342. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(c) (U.K.). 
 343. Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(c)(i). 
 344. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, pt. 1, § 4.2(2) (Can.). 
 345. [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(e) (Austl.). 
 346. [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(c) (India). 
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Variations and Observations 
6.  Promoting 
lawyers’ 
compliance 
with 
professional 
principles 
(including 
competent and 
professional 
service) 
 U.K. § 1(1)(h)353
 Scotland § 1(f)
 
354
 Denmark Bylaw 1
 
355
 British Columbia 
§ 3(a)(iii)
 
356
 Manitoba § 3(2)(a)
 
357
 New Brunswick 
§ 5(d)
 
358
 Nova Scotia 
§§ 4(2)(b), 33
 
359
 Prince Edward Island 
§ 4(b)
 
360
 Saskatchewan 
§ 3.1(c)
 
361
 Yukon § 3(a)(iii)
 
362
 Draft Australia 
s 1.1.3(b)
 
363
 Draft India § 3(h)
 
364
 Draft Ireland 
§ 9(4)(f)
 
365
There is variability in the 
way this concept is 
conveyed.  The United 
Kingdom and Scotland refer 
to professional principles 
and then list them in a 
separate section.
 
366  
Australia does not refer to 
professional principles, but 
identifies competency and 
maintaining high ethical and 
professional standards.367  
Denmark refers to 
discharging the duties and 
obligations of lawyers.368  
Some refer to the 
professional responsibility 
of lawyers.369
 
 347. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(e) (U.K.). 
 
 348. Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(c)(ii). 
 349. [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(e) (India). 
 350. Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), pt. 2, § 9(4)(d) (Ir.). 
 351. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(c) (U.K.). 
 352. [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(e) (Austl.). 
 353. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1(1)(h) (U.K.). 
 354. Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1(f). 
 355. Bylaws of the Danish Bar and Law Society, supra note 123, at bylaw 1. 
 356. Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, pt. 1, § 3(a)(iii) (Can.). 
 357. Legal Profession Act, C.C.S.M., c. L107, pt. 2, § 3(2)(a) (Can.). 
 358. Law Society Act, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89, pt. 2, § 5(d) (Can.). 
 359. Legal Profession Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 28, pt. 3, §§ 4(2)(b), 33 (Can.). 
 360. Legal Profession Act, S.P.E.I. 1992, c. L-6.1, pt. 2, § 4(b) (Can.). 
 361. Legal Profession Act, 1990, S.S. 1990, c. L-10.1, pt. 2, § 3.1(c) (Can.). 
 362. Legal Profession Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 134, pt. 1, § 3(a)(iii) (Can.). 
 363. [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(b) (Austl.). 
 364. [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3(h) (India). 
 365. Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011), pt. 2, § 9(4)(f) (Ir.). 
 366. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 1(h), 2 (U.K.); Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 
2010, (A.S.P. 16), §§ 1(f), 2. 
 367. [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(b) (Austl.). 
 368. Bylaws of the Danish Bar and Law Society, supra note 123, at bylaw 1. 
 369. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act, C.C.S.M., c. L107, pt. 2, § 3(2)(a) (Can.). 
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7.  Ensuring 
that lawyer 
regulation is 
consistent with 
principles of 
“good 
regulation” 
 Ontario 
§ 4.2(4)–(5)370
 Draft Australia 
s 1.1.3(a), (e)
 
371
Most jurisdictions do not 
include these types of 
principles.
 
372  Australia and 
Ontario list regulatory 
principles but express them 
differently.373
 
 
  
 
 370. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, pt. 1, § 4.2(4)–(5) (Can.). 
 371. [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(a), (e) (Austl.). 
 372. See generally infra Appendix 2. 
 373. See [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3(e) (Austl.); Law 
Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, pt. 1, § 4.2 (4)–(5) (Can.).  Both Australia and Ontario refer 
to proportionality.  Australia also refers to national consistency and regulation that is 
efficient, effective, targeted & proportionate, whereas Ontario refers to timely, open and 
efficient regulation. Id.; see also supra note 103 (citing the Manitoba, Ontario, and Nova 
Scotia laws that apply to multiple professions, including the legal profession). 
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APPENDIX 2 
EXISTING AND DRAFT REGULATORY OBJECTIVES  
(IN REVERSE ALPHABETICAL ORDER) 
 
United Kingdom [England and Wales]374
Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1 (U.K.). 
 
 
(1) In this Act a reference to “the regulatory objectives” is a reference to 
the objectives of— 
(a) protecting and promoting the public interest; 
(b) supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law; 
(c) improving access to justice; 
(d) protecting and promoting the interests of consumers; 
(e) promoting competition in the provision of services within 
subsection (2) [referring to authorized persons]; 
(f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal 
profession; 
(g) increasing public understanding of the citizen’s legal rights and duties; 
(h) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles. 
 
Scotland375
Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1. 
 
 
1 Regulatory Objectives 
For the purposes of this Act, the regulatory objectives are the objectives 
of— 
(a) supporting— 
(i) the constitutional principle of the rule of law, 
(ii) the interests of justice, 
(b) protecting and promoting— 
(i) the interests of consumers, 
(ii) the public interest generally, 
(c) promoting— 
(i) access to justice, 
 
 374. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (U.K.), available at http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/
content.aspx?LegType=All+Primary&PageNumber=3&NavFrom=2&parentActiveTextDocI
d=3423426&ActiveTextDocId=3423429&filesize=4184. 
 375. Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2010/16/pdfs/asp_20100016_en.pdf. 
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(ii) competition in the provision of legal services, 
(d) promoting an independent, strong, varied and effective legal 
profession, 
(e) encouraging equal opportunities (as defined in Section L2 of Part II of 
Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998) within the legal profession, 
(f) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles. 
 
New Zealand376
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, pt. 1, § 3(1)(a)–(c). 
 
 
3 Purposes 
(1) The purposes of this Act are— 
(a) to maintain public confidence in the provision of legal services and 
conveyancing services: 
(b) to protect the consumers of legal services and conveyancing services: 
(c) to recognise the status of the legal profession and to establish the new 
profession of conveyancing practitioner. 
 
Denmark377
Bylaws of the Danish Bar and Law Society 
 
Adopted by the General Meeting of Lawyers on 25 October 2008. 
 
Objects and registered office 
Bylaw 1 
The objects for which the Danish Bar and Law Society is established are 
to guard the independence and integrity of lawyers; 
to ensure and enforce the discharge of the duties and obligations of 
lawyers; 
to maintain the professional skills of lawyers; and 
to work for the benefit of the Danish legal community. 
  
 
 376. Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, pt. 1, § 3(1)(a)–(c), available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2006/0001/latest/DLM364939.html. 
 377. Bylaws of the Danish Bar and Law Society, Adopted by the General Meeting of 
Lawyers on 25 October 2008, available at http://www.advokatsamfundet.dk/Service/
English/Rules/~/media/Files/English/Vedtaegt_for_Det_Danske_Advokatsamfund_-_
08122008_eng2.ashx. 
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Canada 
 
Alberta378
Legal Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8. 
 
Conduct of Members 
Interpretation 
49(1) For the purposes of this Act, any conduct of a member, arising 
from incompetence or otherwise, that 
(a) is incompatible with the best interests of the public or of the members 
of the Society, or 
(b) tends to harm the standing of the legal profession generally, is 
conduct deserving of sanction, whether or not that conduct relates to the 
member’s practice as a barrister and solicitor and whether or not that 
conduct occurs in Alberta. 
British Columbia379
Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9. 
 
Public interest paramount 
3 It is the object and duty of the society 
(a) to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of 
justice by 
(i) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons, 
(ii) ensuring the independence, integrity and honour of its members, 
and 
(iii) establishing standards for the education, professional 
responsibility and competence of its members and applicants for 
membership, and 
(b) subject to paragraph (a), 
(i) to regulate the practice of law, and 
(ii) to uphold and protect the interests of its members. 
Manitoba380
Legal Profession Act, C.C.S.M., c. L107. 
 
Purpose 
3(1) The purpose of the society is to uphold and protect the public 
interest in the delivery of legal services with competence, integrity and 
independence. 
Duties 
3(2) In pursuing its purpose, the society must 
 
 378. Legal Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, available at http://www.qp.alberta.ca
/documents/Acts/l08.pdf. 
 379. Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9 (effective Dec. 31, 1998) (current to Sept. 
21, 2011), available at http://www.bclaws.ca/EPLibraries/bclaws_new/document/ID/
freeside/00_98009_01. 
 380. Legal Profession Act, C.C.S.M., c. L107 (last revised June 12, 2008), available at 
http://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/statutes/ccsm/l107e.php. 
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(a) establish standards for the education, professional responsibility and 
competence of persons practising or seeking the right to practise law in 
Manitoba; and 
(b) regulate the practice of law in Manitoba. 
New Brunswick381
Law Society Act, 1996, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89. 
 
5 It is the object and duty of the Society 
(a) to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of 
justice, 
(b) to preserve and protect the rights and freedoms of all persons, 
(c) to ensure the independence, integrity and honor of its members, 
(d) to establish standards for the education, professional responsibility 
and competence of its members and applicants for membership, 
(e) to regulate the legal profession, and 
(f) subject to paragraphs (a) to (d), to uphold and protect the interests of 
its members. 
Newfoundland and Labrador382
Law Society Act, S.N.L. 1999, c. L-9.1. 
 
Powers of benchers 
18. (1.1) The benchers have the authority to regulate the practice of law 
and the legal profession in the public interest. 
Northwest Territories383
Legal Profession Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1998, c. L-2. 
 
PART III DISCIPLINE 
INTERPRETATION 
Definitions 22.  In this Part, “conduct unbecoming a barrister and 
solicitor or student-at-law” means any act or conduct that, in the judgment 
of a Sole Inquirer or Committee of Inquiry, or the Court of Appeal, as the 
case may be, 
(a) is such as to be harmful to the best interests of the public or the 
members of the Society, or 
(b) tends to harm the standing of the legal profession generally[.] 
  
 
 381. Law Society Act, 1996, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89, available at http://www.lawsociety-
barreau.nb.ca/assets/documents/law-society-act.doc. 
 382. Law Society Act, S.N.L. 1999, c. L-9.1, amended by 2008 c. 17, available at 
http://assembly.nl.ca/Legislation/sr/statutes/l09-1.htm. 
 383. Legal Profession Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1998, c. L-2 (last revised May 19, 2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov.nt.ca/PDF/ACTS/Legal%20Profession.pdf. 
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Nova Scotia384
Legal Profession Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 28. 
 
Purpose of Society 
4 (1) The purpose of the Society is to uphold and protect the public 
interest in the practice of law. 
(2) In pursuing its purpose, the Society shall 
(a) establish standards for the qualifications of those seeking the 
privilege of membership in the Society; 
(b) establish standards for the professional responsibility and competence 
of members in the Society; 
(c) regulate the practice of law in the Province; and 
(d) seek to improve the administration of justice in the Province by 
(i) regularly consulting with organizations and communities in the 
Province having an interest in the Society’s purpose, including, but 
not limited to, organizations and communities reflecting the 
economic, ethnic, racial, sexual and linguistic diversity of the 
Province, and 
(ii) engaging in such other relevant activities as approved by the 
Council. 
 
Protection of public and integrity of profession 
33 The purpose of Sections 34 to 53 [regarding the Complaints 
Investigation Committee] is to protect the public and preserve the integrity 
of the legal profession by 
(a) promoting the competent and ethical practice of law by the members 
of the Society; 
(b) resolving complaints of professional misconduct, conduct 
unbecoming a lawyer, professional incompetence and incapacity; 
(c) providing for the protection of clients’ interests through the 
appointment of receivers and custodians in appropriate circumstances; 
(d) addressing the circumstances of members of the Society requiring 
assistance in the practice of law, and in handling or avoiding personal, 
emotional, medical or substance abuse problems; and 
(e) providing relief to individual clients of members of the Society and 
promoting the rehabilitation of members. 
  
 
 384. Legal Profession Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 28, as amended by S.N.S. 2010, c. 56, 
(consolidated to Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://nslegislature.ca/legc/statutes/
legalpro.htm. 
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Nunavut385
Legal Profession Act, R.S.N.W.T. (Nun.) 1988, c. L-2. 
 
PART III, DISCIPLINE 
Conduct unbecoming 
[22] (2) Any act or conduct that in the judgment of a Sole Inquirer or a 
Committee of Inquiry or the Court of Appeal, as the case may be, 
(a) is such as to be harmful to the best interests of the public or the 
members of the Society, or 
(b) tends to harm the standing of the legal profession generally, is 
conduct unbecoming a barrister and solicitor or a student-at-law within 
the meaning of this section. 
Ontario386
Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8. 
 
Function of the Society 
4.1 It is a function of the Society to ensure that, 
(a) all persons who practise law in Ontario or provide legal services in 
Ontario meet standards of learning, professional competence and 
professional conduct that are appropriate for the legal services they 
provide; and 
(b) the standards of learning, professional competence and professional 
conduct for the provision of a particular legal service in a particular area 
of law apply equally to persons who practise law in Ontario and persons 
who provide legal services in Ontario. 
 
Principles to be applied by the Society 
4.2 In carrying out its functions, duties and powers under this Act, the 
Society shall have regard to the following principles: 
1. The Society has a duty to maintain and advance the cause of justice 
and the rule of law. 
2. The Society has a duty to act so as to facilitate access to justice for the 
people of Ontario. 
3. The Society has a duty to protect the public interest. 
4. The Society has a duty to act in a timely, open and efficient manner. 
5. Standards of learning, professional competence and professional 
conduct for licensees and restrictions on who may provide particular 
legal services should be proportionate to the significance of the 
regulatory objectives sought to be realized. 
 
 385. Legal Profession Act, R.S.N.W.T. (Nun.) 1988, c. L-2 (current to Dec. 19, 2007), 
available at http://www.justice.gov.nu.ca/apps/authoring/dspPage.aspx?page=CURRENT+
CONSOLIDATIONS+OF+ACTS+AND+REGULATIONS&letter=L. 
 386. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/
html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90l08_e.htm. 
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Prince Edward Island387
Legal Profession Act, S.P.E.I. 1992, c. L-6.1, c. 39. 
 
4. The objects of the society are 
(a) to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of 
justice; 
(b) to establish standards for the education, professional responsibility 
and competence of its members and applicants for membership; 
(c) to ensure the independence, integrity and honour of the society and its 
members; 
(d) to regulate the practice of law; and 
(e) to uphold and protect the interests of its members. 
Quebec388
An Act respecting the Barreau du Québec, R.S.Q., c. B-1
 
389
Code des professions, L.R.Q., c. C-26. 
; 
12. The function of the Office shall be to see that each order ensures the 
protection of the public.  For that purpose, the Office may, in particular, in 
collaboration with each order, monitor the operation of the various 
mechanisms established within the order pursuant to this Code and, where 
applicable, the Act constituting the professional order.  
Saskatchewan390
Legal Profession Act, 1990, S.S. 1990, c. L-10.1. 
 
Duty of society 
3.1 In the exercise of its powers and the discharge of its responsibilities, 
it is the duty of the society, at all times: 
(a) to act in the public interest; 
(b) to regulate the profession and to govern the members in accordance 
with this Act and the rules; and 
(c) to protect the public by assuring the integrity, knowledge, skill, 
proficiency and competence of members. 
 
 387. Legal Profession Act, S.P.E.I. 1992, c. L-6.1, c. 39 (last revised Dec. 9, 2010), 
available at http://www.gov.pe.ca/law/statutes/pdf/l-06_1.pdf. 
 388. An Act respecting the Barreau du Québec [English title], R.S.Q., c. B-1 (last revised 
Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/
telecharge.php?type=2&file=%2F%2FB_1%2FB1_A.htm; Code des professions, Law R.Q., 
c. C-26, available at http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/
telecharge.php?type=2&file=/C_26/C26.htm&PHPSESSID=36617b2f4fa6d2928dd8ec6f1de
f1284 [French], http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/
telecharge.php?type=2&file=/C_26/C26_A.HTM [English]; Ordres Professionels, OFFICE 
DES PROFESSIONS QUÉBEC, http://www.opq.gouv.qc.ca/ordres-professionnels/ (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2012) (describing the functions). 
 389. The Act respecting the Barreau du Québec does not contain any objectives language.  
But the overarching Code of the Professions, which is administered by the Office des 
professions du Québec, includes “objectives” language.  What appears here is an unofficial 
translation of this Act. 
 390. Legal Profession Act, 1990, S.S. 1990, c. L-10.1 (current through 2010), available at 
http://www.qp.gov.sk.ca/documents/English/Statutes/Statutes/L10-1.pdf. 
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Yukon391
Legal Profession Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 134. 
 
Duty of the society 
3 It is the object and duty of the society 
(a) to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of 
justice by 
(i) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons, 
(ii) ensuring the independence, integrity and honour of its members, 
and 
(iii) establishing standards for the education, professional 
responsibility and competence of its members and applicants for 
membership, and 
(b) subject to paragraph (a), 
(i) to regulate the practice of law, and 
(ii) to uphold and protect the interest of its members. 
 
REGULATORY OBJECTIVES THAT HAVE BEEN DRAFTED BUT NOT YET 
ENACTED 
(IN REVERSE ALPHABETICAL ORDER) 
 
Ireland392
Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011). 
 
 
9 (4) The Authority shall, in performing its functions of the regulation of 
the provision of legal services under this Act, have regard to the objectives 
of— 
(a) protecting and promoting the public interest, 
(b) supporting the proper and effective administration of justice, 
(c) protecting and promoting the interests of consumers relating to the 
provision of legal services, 
(d) promoting competition in the provision of legal services in the State, 
(e) encouraging an independent, strong and effective legal profession, and 
(f) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles 
specified in subsection (5). 
  
 
 391. Legal Profession Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 134 (current through 2010), available at 
http://www.lawsocietyyukon.com/act/lpa_dec2004.pdf. 
 392. Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Act No. 58/2011) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2011/5811/b5811d.pdf. 
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India393
[Draft] Legal Practitioners (Regulations and Maintenance of Standards in 
Professions, Protecting the Interest of Clients and Promoting the Rule of 
Law) Act, Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department 
of Legal Affairs. 
 
 
3. The Regulatory objectives. – (1) In this Act a reference to “the 
regulatory objectives” is a reference to the objectives of— 
(a) protecting and promoting the public interest; 
(b) supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law; 
(c) improving access to justice; 
(d) protecting and promoting the interests of the clients of the legal 
practitioners; 
(e) promoting healthy competition amongst the legal practitioners for 
improving the quality of service; 
(f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal 
profession with ethical obligations and with a strong sense of duty 
towards the courts and tribunals where they appear; 
(g) creating legal awareness amongst the general public and to make the 
consumers of the legal profession well informed of their legal rights and 
duties; 
(h) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles. 
 
Australia394
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) National Legal Profession 
Reform, [Draft] Legal Profession National Law (31 May 2011). 
 
 
The objectives of this Law are to promote the administration of justice 
and an efficient and effective Australian legal profession, by: 
(a) providing and promoting national consistency in the law applying to 
the Australian legal profession; and 
(b) ensuring lawyers are competent and maintain high ethical and 
professional standards in the provision of legal services; and 
(c) enhancing the protection of clients of law practices and the protection 
of the public generally; and 
(d) empowering clients of law practices to make informed choices about 
the services they access and the costs involved; and 
 
 393. [Draft] Legal Practitioners Act, 2010, § 3 (India), available at 
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/draft/NALSA.pdf. 
 394. [Draft] Legal Profession National Law 2011, ch 1, pt 1, s 1.1.3 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Documents/National%20Legal%20Profession%20Legislation%20-
%20September%202011%20(%20for%20web%20site%20).pdf. 
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(e) promoting regulation of the legal profession that is efficient, effective, 
targeted and proportionate; and 
(f) providing a co-regulatory framework within which an appropriate level 
of independence of the legal profession from the executive arm of 
government is maintained. 
 
